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Abstract 
 
  This research paper is focusing on the private military-security companies (PMSC-s); these 
are entities that profit from the offering of military and security related expertise that until 
recently were considered the prerogative of the state and were provided only by state military, 
police and intelligence agencies. The services private military-security companies offer are 
wide ranging and cover tasks in the areas of combat, training, support, security, intelligence 
and reconstruction. 
  Because of the increasing debate about the legitimacy of the private military-security 
companies this study was constructed. Main focus of this paper is to understand the 
international legal status afforded to the private military-security companies that provide 
front-line support services to their clients. Therefore, the companies this paper is focusing on 
are those that have provided front-line support services; most known are Executive Outcomes, 
Sandline International and Balckwater Worldwide (now Academi). It is important to 
understand that only current international legislations and conventions that deal with private 
violence are discussed, nevertheless, some national laws will be discussed as well, so we 
could understand little bit more about the difficulties of regulating and controlling private 
military-security industry.  
  This study concludes that operations of private military-security companies that provide 
front-line support services are not legitimate because there is no international law that gives 
them legitimacy to carry out those kinds of operations, it does not matter that military-security 
industry has constructed their own view of legitimacy. Besides, all the operations of PMSC-s 
are carried out in a vacuum of effective regulation and accountability at the international and 
national levels. This is a big problem for all the actors in the international stage and must be 
solved quickly.  
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Introduction  
  “If a prince holds on to his state by means of mercenary armies, he will 
never be stable or secure. Mercenaries are disunited, ambitious, 
undisciplined and disloyal. … In peacetime you are plundered by them, in 
war by your enemies. The reason for this is that they have no other love nor 
other motive to keep them in the field then a meager salary, which is not 
enough to make them want to die for you. … As a result, these condottieri 
have conducted Italy into slavery and disgrace.” (Machiavelli 2005: 43, 46) 
 
  Like we see, the discussions and critique about private soldiers and their organizations are 
not something that has been revealed in the end of Cold War by the Western researchers, it 
has been the research topic for more then six hundred years. Of course thanks to the creation 
of all citizen armies and nation states in the middle of 19th century the analytical topic about 
the need, efficiency, morality and control of private soldiers had its “hibernation” period but 
because of the re-emersion of these soldiers in the Cold War period this topic is again an 
issue. After these soldiers emerged from the “shadows” their importance and necessity has 
only increased but who are these private soldiers? 
  These soldiers have been called by many names during their existence and it is not as 
accurate as it seems to call mercenaries and their organizations, before the last decade of 20th 
century, corporate. Yes, they had some sort of organizations but the corporate structure and 
efficiency with it is something entirely new and describes this new private violence that has 
emerged from the “ruins” of Cold War. These new entities are known as private military-
security companies (PMSC-s) (the use of this term is explained thoroughly in subchapter 
1.2.1). Private military-security companies are profiting from the offering of military and 
security related expertise that until recently were considered the prerogative of the state and 
were provided only by state military, police and intelligence agencies. The services private 
military-security companies offer are wide ranging and cover tasks in the areas of combat, 
training, support, security, intelligence and reconstruction. Whereas some tasks might involve 
the possibility of exercising force, as in case of armed protection, a large proportion of them, 
such as the provision of risk advice and intelligence support, are not intrinsically lethal; 
nevertheless, all the services PMSC-s provide involve knowledge of the use of lethal force 
and belong to the hybrid public-private culture now permeating the state monopoly of 
violence (Ortiz 2010: 6). 
  All the corporate entities are criticized in some point because their actions might not be 
moral and/or transparent enough for the public to understand or approve, as we have seen in 
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the case of investment banks and brokerage firms in Wall Street, however, those are not even 
closely as criticized and controversial as PMSC-s. The debate about private military-security 
companies bifurcates along the two equally strong lines; some see PMSC-s as genuine and 
legitimate commercial enterprises, others, on the other hand, see them as mercenaries and/or 
profiteers of the worst kind. For supporters, they are flexible and cost-effective alternatives to 
state soldiers and police, facilitating commercial activity into otherwise unviable market and 
even seen as potential peacekeepers.  
  Critics, however, see them as agents that undermine state authority, intending to capture the 
natural riches of the developing world for the benefit of multinational corporations and 
ultimately they are seen as the agents fostering underdevelopment and conflict. 
  So, it is crucial for us to understand, are today’s private military-security companies’ actions 
indeed legitimate undertakings or are they just another form of mercenary operations. This is 
the main question I am trying to answer in my research paper. It is understandable that there is 
significant reluctance to legitimatize the operations of PMSC-s because we are instinctively 
oppose to relinquish the state’s role as the provider of security. However, this kind of 
“protectionism” is extremely short-sighted. Thanks to the changes in the international security 
environment and in the society, states are not able to solve “new threats”, like international 
crime, terrorism, environmental hazards and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by 
themselves, so it is quite understandable that increasingly stronger economic sector is 
providing the “helping hand” to the states and other entities that might need security services 
in this post-Cold War world. But still states must have political legitimacy over military 
affairs because if the state is undercut or marginalized in the respect, there is a risk that one of 
the traditional cores of security governance – states’ collective and general control of the use 
of force – will be destabilized, affecting not only the state actor but the entire international 
system (Ballesteros 1999: 50). For the role of the state in the military affairs to be maintained 
in the face of a privatization of security, the use of private security and military service 
providers needs to take place within agreed structures and processes designed to safeguard 
legitimacy and accountability in military affairs (Holmqvist 2005: 8). Unfortunately, at 
present these structures are too weak to control security industry and this is one of the reasons 
why private military-security industry has to protect itself against accusations of being 
illegitimate and closely connected with mercenary operations and that’s why people are very 
cautious when they deal with private security providers. So, it is impossible to go forward 
with the private security debate if we do not find an answer to this question.  
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  After the Cold War military operations changed, states had to deal with not only 
conventional military operations that national armies were trained and ready for but 
operations, like humanitarian interventions, peace enforcement/keeping, security providing 
and so on. This was not what national armies and security agencies were prepared for. So, 
because of this change and the inadequacy of the states to deal with those new operations 
satisfactorily, private military-security industry emerged. The structure and capabilities of 
modern PMSC-s parallel the range of operations within the spectrum of modern conflicts 
(Goddard 2001: 1), however, majority of companies in this industry are not providing services 
on the forefront of the battle-space (engaging in actual fighting either providing front-line 
units or specialists and/or direct command and control of field units) but provide logistics and 
technical support (BRS, KBR), gather intelligence (Global Linguist Solutions), provide 
security (Vinnell Corp.) and train military and security personnel in different countries 
(DynCorp). Besides those, there are many more different services that private military-
security industry can and is providing for its clients. So, the majority of the contracts in this 
industry are intended to support extant military operations and training regimes. Those 
contracts do have strategic affect, it is folly to think otherwise, but they are not as significant 
force multipliers as companies that provide actual fighting forces and/or command personnel. 
These “active” companies have been structured so they can conduct military style operations 
that can deliberately transform the security environment within which they are contracted to 
operate (Goddard 2001: 2). Most known companies within this framework are Executive 
Outcomes (EO), Sandline International, Strategic Consulting International (SCI) and of 
course Blackwater Worldwide (in December of 2011 it changed its name to Academi).  
  This research paper will focus on private military-security companies that conduct “active 
military assistance that have a strategic impact on the political and security environments of 
the countries in which they operate” (Isenberg 2000: 13), this mainly because those 
companies’ operations are accused of being closely connected with mercenary activities in the 
Cold War and even earlier historic periods. Also we have to analyze the international legal 
status of the PMSC-s and the effects and ramifications of using them to increase security.  
  So, because of that my research question is: Are private military-security companies that 
conduct active military assistance operations legitimate force multipliers in the 21st century 
conflicts? Legitimacy is understood in this paper as actions that are accordance with 
recognized and enacted world bodies of international law (Holmqvist 2005), so, these are 
conventions and legislations that control and legitimize international conduct in conflicts 
and/or security enforcement environments around the world. Thus, it is not so much about 
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combat active PMSC-s rightful legal status why we need to find an answer to the research 
question (nonetheless it is important), because those commercial entities have understood that 
this uncertainty does not actually affect their fiscal performance but we need the answer 
because this kind of disorder may cause situations where actors of international system may 
just ignore the rules and point out that rules they ignore are somewhat deficient for the new 
international situation they are in. This might destroy the international legal system that has 
been a hallmark of interaction in international system. So, we do not only need to find out if 
PMSC-s are legitimate, we need to know how operations of private military-security 
companies are effectively regulated and controlled and whom can we held accountable for 
actions and conduct of PMSC-s?  
  The main purpose of this paper is to analyze extant international legislations/conventions 
and most significant national laws that deal with mercenaries and their activities in order to 
determine the comparative status of active military assistance operations conducted by private 
military-security firms. Still, mainly I will focus on the international conventions and 
legislations because those are documents that deal mostly with mercenary activities, however, 
some national laws will be discussed quite extensively, so we could understand little bit more 
about the difficulties of regulating and controlling private military-security industry.  
  This thesis has structured on an analytical rational in concert with deductive and inductive 
reasoning and the conduct of research incorporates the spectrum of objective issues at the 
international realm, devolving to subjective issues from within the private military-security 
industry itself and associated vested interest groups (clients). The analytical data will be 
presented like this: firstly, I will seek to discus the current framework and structure of enacted 
international legislation and convention that deal with mercenaries and their activities; of 
course I will discus some of the main differences between PMSC-s and mercenaries because 
it seams that they are not the same thing. This framework will be crucial to the construct of 
the thesis because it will establish the bases for further contrasting and analysis between 
mercenaries and private military-security companies. Secondly I will seek to determine the 
current legal status of private military-security companies, using again international 
legislation and conventions that deal with mercenary activity and/or define the term 
“mercenary”. This will answer the primary question of the paper. Finally, I will discus the 
difficulties that accrue when we start regulating this military-security industry and what kind 
of methods different parties have used to control the activities and operations of PMSC-s; of 
course some accountability problems will be discussed. This analysis will answer our 
secondary question of the paper.  
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  This paper is divided into four chapters. All of the chapters are connected with each other, so 
we could find the answers to our questions more effectively. 
  First chapter deals with origins of the PMSC-s, it shows where actually these entities 
(PMSC-s) are coming from and from what historical entity they have developed into actors 
we know them today. Then I will define private military-security companies and show why 
there is not a universal definition for this industry (manly why different researchers have not 
managed to agree with one universal definition) and of course some of the main and most 
used categories of military-security industry will be mentioned and described. Finally in this 
chapter I will discuss some of the most important issues that have made the growth of this 
industry possible. Second chapter is dealing with the differences between the private military-
security companies and mercenaries, of course there are some similarities and connections but 
they do not equate. The third chapter is the most important, in there I am attempting to find an 
answer to my research question and find out what is the legal status of private military-
security companies. And finally, in the fourth chapter I am looking at different regulatory 
methods we can use to regulate and control military-security industry, of course 
accountability issues are looked at. Besides some workable recommendations will be offered 
how we could control and regulate this industry.  
  The significance of this thesis, hopefully, is that it will determine and articulate an objective 
measurement of the contemporary extent of international legitimacy for the private military-
security companies that conduct active front-line support operations and other supporting 
roles on the theater of conflict. This measurement of international legitimacy will in turn 
enable a stronger, clearer, and informed national positions, which can be used in future 
debates within the international realm as to the proper roles and associated ramifications of 
using PMSC-s.  
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1. Private Military-Security Companies – Origins, 
Definition and Its Growing Rise of Significance  
 
  Before I can start analyzing what are today’s private military-security companies we must 
understand how they have evolved into these commercial entities and from where these 
commercial private structures originate. Are these structures European (Western) in there 
nature or are they something that was developed in Asia like so many other things we have 
started to regard in the West as our own, like gunpowder, compass, paper, printing-press 
mechanisms, bureaucracy and et cetera. To understand the origins of those commercial and 
military-security entities we must understand there genealogy first and only after that we can 
start defining this phenomenon. 
  Thanks to the Iraq War this phenomenon became widely known and it is not a surprise 
because Iraq was the place that introduced private contractors to the majority of Western 
citizens. It was estimated that about 20 000 contractors were in Iraq already in 2003 (The 
Economist 06.07.2012), and this number is only increased over the years, besides many 
PMSC-s were actively involved with operations against insurgents in places like Fallujah, Al 
Najaf, Baghdad and so on (Ortiz 2010). Mass media focused extensively on those operations 
and the personnel behind them; thus, making many PMSC-s quite well known (Blackwater 
might be the best example). However, like I already noted, this phenomenon is not something 
entirely new nor exclusively connected with modern asymmetrical conflicts. So, it is crucial 
for us to find out how these entities developed into actors we see them today? 
 
1.1 The Origins of Private Military-Security Companies  
 
  Like we already saw in the introduction, the privatization of violence is not a new 
phenomenon; it was widely practiced until the 19th century. As kings and princes tried to 
extend their control over new tracts of land and sea corridors, the feudal system of military 
service prevented them from raising the required large armies, so this constraint led them to 
employ mercenaries (Smith 2002-03: 105). The early Europeans use of organized mercenaries 
was in the form of private bodies in the 14th century known variously as Free Companies. 
These companies developed in time in Italy into condottieri (meaning literally, military 
contractors), who offered there services to the highest bidder.(Smith 2002-03: 105 – 106) This 
 12
system developed permanent companies of armed personnel that were hired out for specific 
periods of time for Italian city-states or monarchs in and near Italy. Of course many areas of 
Europe had there own condottieri systems but most important is that all of them were doing 
there business in small areas near today’s Central and Western Europe, no global reach or 
contact with non-European countries. The commonality of the practice resulted in the term 
condottieri transcending its specific use and becoming an alternative means of reference to 
conventional mercenary (Ortiz 2010: 15). That is why some commentators have argued that 
there is a historical parallel between PMSC-s and Free Companies developed by condottieri 
system. Unfortunately those Free Companies did not have the structure or the global reach to 
be the historical embryos of today’s private military-security firms. 
  In early 17th century private trade in Europe found a new form of expression in collective 
capitalism, which materialized in part by formation of joint-stock trading companies. Those 
companies were sanctioned by governments through charters. A charter stipulated the rules 
for the constitution and governance of a company and granted monopoly power in a certain 
area. (Ortiz 2007: 12) The main motivation for their creation was the exploration of the 
profitable trade in spices, sugar, tea, silk, china, and many other goods from the Indies. The 
term, Indies, was used actually to describe remote lands far away from Europe; predominantly 
in the East but after colonizing the Americas the term West Indies was developed by 
merchants to describe South-America and the Caribbean. This new form of enterprising 
introduced the idea of incorporation, with stockholders supplying the capital needed for 
companies to operate and companies, which assumed a unified identity, was managed by 
courts of directors and sanctioned by public charter (Ortiz 2007: 12). Most well known 
countries who positioned themselves at the forefront of this new charter system were, 
naturally, England and United Provinces (the Dutch Netherlands) but this system was 
emulated by other European countries as well and used to sanction mercantile operations in 
all over the world. In those days it was very common to create a terminable stock for the 
overseas trading companies, these stocks lasted only for single or seasonal trips overseas but 
in some cases the duration of stock allowed companies to exist for substantially longer 
periods of time. (Ortiz 2007: 13)  
  Surely charters were constantly modified and because of that the companies were also 
modified and reorganized constantly. There were only a few overseas trading companies 
which “became permanent, anonymous associations of capital, comparable to modern 
business corporations” (Steensgaard 1981: 247). The Dutch East Indies Company and the 
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English East India Company were the ones that transformed into those types of commercial 
entities in the 17th century.  
  In this century we can recognize also a gradual emergence of modern financial institutions 
because formation of trade companies demanded a creation of a financial market in which its 
stock units could be bought and sold easily, and the development of techniques for trading 
and speculating in these stocks (Davis 1973: 185). First stock exchange was created in the 
United Provinces but quite quickly London followed and “from the mid-seventeen century 
onwards, shares were being traded … at prices which fell or rose according to the company’s 
reports of profit and the declaration of dividends” (Braudel 1985: 106). 
  The public sanctioning of trade monopoly and the private use of force are two defining 
features of the overseas charter system. An important justification given for monopoly rights 
deals with the costs that the companies had to incur in developing the infrastructure needed 
for distant trade. While a monopoly could not be maintained without the use of force, the 
expenditure in the maintenance of private armies and navies and the development of overseas 
military infrastructure (forts and garrisons) served also as a justification for monopoly trade 
rights of those companies. These company strongholds were not only important for the 
protection of company agents but they were also protecting the trade routes against interlopers 
(unlicensed competitors) and against restless natives in the Indies. (Ortiz 2007: 15) Of course 
force was not only used against the restless native tribes or pirates and privateers but it was a 
necessity to gain control over established merchant networks. Steensgaard (1981: 251) brings 
out two most important criteria’s for the survival of the overseas trading company: their 
ability to defend their privileges and their ability to protect and enlarge their capital. It is 
understood that these companies relied heavily on force and had little or no concerns with 
public relations or the rules of war regulating combat in Europe. For example, in the case of 
the island of Banda in the Indonesian Archipelago (owned by the Dutch East Indies 
Company), private forces, paid by the company, killed every single male over the age of 
fifteen that they could get there hands on, reducing the population from 15 000 to 600 in 15 
years (Kramer 2007: 26 – 27).  
  It is quite obvious that these overseas trading companies enjoyed a good degree of autonomy 
from their respective governments, “which allowed them to ascribe themselves functions 
more closely associated with the institution of the modern state, prominently the right to 
maintain armed forces” (Ortiz 2007: 16). Like in the case of the English East India Company 
(EIC) who had three administrative areas in India (Presidencies of Bombay, Madras and 
Bengal) each maintaining their own army with its own commander-in-chief. These armies 
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were paid for out of the Company’s Indian revenues and together were larger then the British 
Army itself. All the officers were British and had there education and training from 
Company’s military academy in England, however, vast majority of Company’s troops were 
natives (called “sepoys”). (Kramer 2007: 25) Not only having a larger armies than there home 
nations, these companies paid no attention, only when it suited there economic interests, what 
their governments were saying and doing at home. For example EIC supported the Shah of 
Persia in seizing Hormuz from the Portuguese and for that got trading privileges such as being 
free of customs and getting a share of custom duties paid by other companies, meanwhile, in 
Europe British government tried to ally with the Portuguese against Spain (Kramer 2007: 26). 
As the companies were allowed to maintain private forces and had the right to conclude 
treaties with foreign powers, “the distinction between the company as a private body of 
enterprise and as a public authority enjoying more or less sovereign powers was actually 
somewhat lost” (Klein 1981: 23). Ortiz argues that “this is a distinctive feature of PMSC-s, 
which like their early modern precursor partakes in both public and private roles”. As private 
enterprises, PMSC-s seek to maximize profits and market share and by delivering services 
that enter the arena of the monopoly of violence of the state, so they assume a public role as 
well. (Ortiz 2007: 17) This is the one of the unifying feature what connects today’s PMSC-s 
with those overseas trading companies developed by the charter system but it is not the only 
one.  
  The company model adopted by the English and the Dutch set a standard for European 
merchants in general, and in the process, their companies defined the basic features of the 
overseas trading company (Ortiz 2007: 17 – 18). These companies were first who built a 
modern management and accounting structures and by doing that they came to resemble 
multinational corporations. Blusse and Gaastra (1981: 8) praise the corporate model of those 
companies, noting that it “was a most impressively organized structure, which, through the 
combination of good information, policy and execution of affairs, were indeed very similar to 
today’s multinationals”. Although there is not a standard definition for multinational 
corporations, it is understood that regardless of size, multinational needs to operate in a 
foreign country. Based on this point there should be no reason not to regard companies such 
as Dutch East Indies Company and EIC as precursors to multinational corporations and if 
these companies can be regarded as precursors to multinational corporations, there is no 
reason not to regard their smaller counterparts in same way. (Ortiz 2007: 19) Of course some 
might say that many of these overseas trading companies had no continuity of capital, they 
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existed for a relatively short period of time, but in today’s world, thanks to mergers and stock 
market speculations, many multinational corporations have a short life span as well.  
  Being a contextualized part of the evolution of mercenary practices, today’s PMSC-s are 
being historically linked with “Free companies” of the condottieri system. However, the Free 
companies of the condottieri system lacked a multinational business character that is 
necessary to establish a link with private military-security companies. (Ortiz 2007: 22) This 
system was a phenomenon largely confined to the Italian peninsula and had no global reach, 
however, overseas trading companies of the charter system had not only a global reach and 
force needed to have a link with today’s private military-security firms but they were 
controlled, managed and owned by rules of modern multinational corporations and that is why 
they are the historical embryos of private military-security companies.  
  Now we know where today’s private military-security companies originate, so, it is a lot 
easier for us to find a working definition that could describe those entities in the modern 
security environment. However, an attempt to subdivide and categorize these private actors is 
extremely problematic and it has been much debated issue. Nevertheless, it is important to 
understand different classifications developed for this industry because through that we can 
much easily show that there are only few companies in this industry that are clearly placed in 
some of those categories, majority of them must be placed on the borderlines.  
 
1.2 Definition and Classifications Developed for the Military-Security 
Industry 
 
  The emergence and astonishing growth of private military-security firms is clearly one of the 
most noteworthy developments in national and international security environment of the past 
three decades. They can provide a range of services commercially, up to and including 
military force, which have long been a privilege of national militaries and other national 
security structures. 
  Nonetheless, there growing importance to the world’s security structure, the unified 
definition of private military-security firms is still under dispute by researchers. The problem 
is that the firms, participating in the private military-security industry, neither look alike nor 
do they even serve the same markets; they vary in their market capitalization, number of 
personnel, firm history, corporate interrelationships, employee experience and characteristics 
and even their operational zone may differ considerably (Singer 2003: 88). However, the 
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single unifying factor, what connects all of those companies in private military-security 
industry, is that all the firms within it offer services that fall within the military domain. But 
even these services themselves are quite diversified. While firms such as EO and Sandline 
offer direct combat service, Saladin Security and ArmorGroup (mostly) offer military training 
and assistance, located primarily off the battlefield; Levdan offers assistance with military 
weapon procurement (where to get weapons one needs), while MPRI provides consulting and 
strategic analysis (how to employ such weapons in the most effective manner). Asmara and 
Network Security Management bid services in the secretive field of intelligence, while 
Kellogg Brown & Root operates in the more innocuous privatizing of military logistics 
(laundry, catering of soldiers and construction of bases). (Singer 2003: 88) For many 
researchers this kind of disorder in side the military-security industry is causing the theoretical 
problems in debates and because of this they have attempted to develop typologies of PMSC-s 
(discussed later in the subchapter). But still what are private military-security companies? 
  Like I already said private military-security companies do not have one unified definition 
(yet) but still there are many researchers who have tried to define the industry. Of course there 
are those whose definitions are to narrow, suitable only for describing one aspects of this 
industry, like Anna Leander (2004) who describes PMSC-s as firms who sell and mediate 
military services. Its true, these firms to deal within military domain but the problem with this 
definition is that it does not describe all the companies working in the military-security 
industry and by using this definition many members of this industry will be left out and that 
by itself creates disorder and problems for commentators trying to understand the industry. 
Much better and more accurate definition for the PMSC-s is given by Carlos Ortiz, who 
defines private military-security companies as “legally established enterprises that make a 
profit by either providing services involving the potential exercise of force in a systematic 
way and by military means, and/or by transfer of that potential to clients through training and 
other practices, such as logistics support, equipment procurement, and intelligence gathering; 
… neither does there have to be an actual or potential military role, a PMSC-s involvement 
may as well be directed towards enhancing the recipient’s military and security capacities” 
(Ortiz 2004: 206). This definition does not only show that PMSC-s are in the military domain 
but it describes the different services they provide for there customers and the different 
methods they use. So we can see that this definition is able to describe the realities of today’s 
private military-security industry.  
  All of these companies are organized like other commercial businesses or firms; they are 
formally incorporated, and although not exactly paragons of transparency, they produce 
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corporate literature, attend international conferences, maintain Web sites, and trend to be 
affiliated to defense or security professional associations (Ortiz 2010: 6). It is quite common 
for those firms to be headquartered close to centers of power such as Washington D.C. and 
London but they do maintain there offices in strategic locations throughout the world, like in 
Middle-East, Africa etc.  
  The other thing we should not forget is that most of the field staff in the industry tends to be 
multi-skilled. A single person, especially one retired from Special Forces, may have the 
necessary knowledge and skills to carry out more than one type of security task and those 
individuals tend to move around the industry much more than other types of industry 
employees (Kinsey 2006: 10). That is why companies have the ability to cover a wide range 
of activities while actually remaining within there core competencies. 
  The definition developed by C. Ortiz should not be one of many but it should be the one that 
everybody in the industry and in the academic world can refer to because it does not only 
explain what private military-security firms are and what they are doing, that is so different 
from other commercial enterprises, but he shows in his definition the reality of how it is being 
done.  
  There are many different typologies created by researchers, mainly because they want to 
explain the realities and scopes of those companies that work within the military-security 
industry but do these typologies really work when we asses them in the real world? 
  There are quite many attempts made at classifying PMSC-s as groups, rather then thinking 
about them on case-by-case bases. The most typical analytic division has been to distinguish 
firms by the general level of their activity. Some firms have been termed “passive” in their 
operations and others “active”. This kind of classification is been used by many researchers 
and companies to describe there activities, for example if company is engaging in combat 
operations or is sizing territory (like EO in Angola or in Sierra Leon) it is placed in the 
“active” category, whereas company defending territory or providing training and advice (like 
MPRI) is placed in the “passive” category. (Singer 2003: 89) 
  Unfortunately, this kind of categorization has been unsuccessful from either an analytical or 
theoretical perspective. The original bases for dividing companies into “passive” or “active” 
came actually from convenience, rather then as taxonomy designed to yield explanatory and 
predictive implications (Krahmann 2010). The major problem with this kind of categorization 
is that firms are conceptually interchangeable as are their results because there is no 
difference what kind of firm you hire, is it “passive” or “active”, it still has significant 
strategic effect and might alter entire course of the war. Another problem with this 
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categorization is that it is quite complicated to categorize different firms objectively because 
different people understand the operations firms undertake quite differently, one person’s 
active firm is another’s passive one, and that itself might lead to the problem.  
  For example, firms, such as ArmorGroup or Southern Cross Security, which offer area 
defense and installation security in conflict zones, are often conceived as “passive”; both of 
these companies do not size territory or attack enemy forces, they simply create a zone of 
security around client’s assets. However, both their operations and the impact that their hiring 
might cause can be described by some other researcher as very active because these 
contractors are not simply security guards in the domestic conception. Such companies’ stake 
out the control of zones and fend off military attacks, sometimes using military-style force 
and thanks to the nature of those wars or conflicts, the facilities that such firms deploy to 
guard are often strategic centers of gravity (like diamond-mines or oil fields that serve as 
primary funding sources for the fighting sides) and because of that their hire and resulting 
defense of these sites is actually perceived as aggression by the other side. (Singer 2003: 89)  
  Some theorists to try circumvent this difficulty by determining the passivity of a firm by 
whether its employees are armed or not. It does set a clearer line of differentiation but 
regrettably it does not work because “the passive-active division is still the crux of the 
system” (Singer 2003: 90). Even without this passive-active division, it would be impossible 
to argue that some firms are more “passive” because there employees are not armed when we 
live in the world were a person pushing a computer button can be just as lethal as another 
person pulling a trigger, whether a companies employees actually operate weapons or not 
does not determine their ultimate role or impact in a conflict. In the instances of both Croatia 
and Ethiopia, private consulting and training were crucial enabling factors to successful, war 
ending military offenses but these firms that offered those services were defined as passive, 
simply because their employees were unarmed and too high-level to be wasted on the 
battlefields (Singer 2004a: 534 – 535).  
  Other attempts at dividing the industry have used boundaries drawn from general political 
science. One this kind of delineating line was whether the firm was purely international or 
domestic in orientation (Singer 2003: 90). Unfortunately this kind of division in today’s world 
is absolutely artificial and folly because it ignores not only the multinational characteristics of 
this industry but also companies rapid ability to transfer and recreate themselves across the 
state boarders. A firm what is considered international one day can close its office and reopen 
its business as domestic in its orientation in the next day, much in the manner that Executive 
Outcomes did (Singer 2003: 90).  
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  Another potential classification system is drawn from offence-defense theory; that is whether 
the firm’s services are designed to bolster or to deter aggression. However, when we apply 
this classification system to the military service industry, this theory quickly suffers the same 
problems as passive-active distinction. (Singer 2003: 90 – 91) The only way to classify firms, 
in this system, is to analyze every company case-by-case bases because their classification 
depends on the specific case company is working on because today’s PMSC-s are able to 
cover a wide range of activities and again the objectivity problem emerges since one person 
might see an aggressive activities and other defensive.  
  The most known and important typologies for the military-security industry are developed 
by Peter W. Singer and C. Kinsey. I am describing them quite briefly, however, it is important 
for the reader to understand those different categories because many of them are being used 
extensively to describe the industry. It happens that authors sometimes use a single category 
to describe the entire private military-security industry; however, one category can not 
describe this complex industry sufficiently. So, maybe this is why we do not have a clear 
academic understanding of this industry?  
 
1.2.1 Typologies Developed for the Industry 
 
  Singer argues that to get read off this passive-active dilemma, in the military-security 
industry, we have to recognize the duality that is at the very nature of this industry. At its base 
level, the industry is driven by both military and economic fundamentals and to create 
working typology those fundamentals must be taken an account. In the military context, the 
best way to structure the industry is by the range of services and the level of force firms can 
offer for there clients. To make it more understandable Singer uses a “Tip of the Spear” 
metaphor. Traditionally, units in standard armed forces are distinguished by their closeness to 
the actual fighting (the “front line”) that result in implications in their training level, unit 
prestige, roles in the battle and so on. For example, a soldier serving on a front-line infantry 
unite (so called the “tip”) has significantly different training experience and career prospects 
then a soldier serving in command or logistics support unit. (Singer 2003: 91) 
  Using this concept, military organizations break down into three broad types of units linked 
to there locations in the battle: those that operate within the general threat, those on the threat 
of war, and those in the actual area of operations, that is the tactical battlefield. If we organize 
private military-security industry by the services offered by equivalent military unit types, it 
more or less mirrors the distinction made among firms within general corporate industry. The 
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type of services that a firm offers and where they are located within the client’s organization 
is how one categorizes normal business outsourcing industry and these outsourcing firms are 
broken down into three broad types: service providers, consulting firms and non-core service 
outsourcing. Thus, the tip-of-the-spear distinction (by military unit location) “is analogous to 
how outsourcing’s linkage with business chains also breaks down”. This actually shows the 
utility of a typology drawn from both contexts. So that is why Singer organizes private 
military-security industry into three broad sectors: Military Provider Firms (they focus on the 
tactical environment, in military sense they are units that are on the front-line), Military 
Consulting Firms (these companies provide military training, advice and active protection 
support (bodyguards) to their clients, the difference with previous “sector” is that MCF 
employees are not part of the combat operations; most typical examples are MPRI, Vinnell 
Corp. and DynCorp) and Military Support Firms (these companies provide supplementary 
military services, including non-lethal aid and assistance, including logistics, intelligence, 
technical support, supply and transportation; typically, firms who operate within this category 
either have expanded into the military support market after reaching a level of dominance in 
their original business adventure elsewhere or found it to be an external area where they could 
maximize previously established commercial capabilities. For example, Brown & Root 
Services (BRS) originally focused on domestic constructions for large-scale civilian projects 
but has since found military development support and logistics a profitable area in which to 
leverage its prior expertise and resources). (Singer 2003: 91, 95, 97 – 98) 
  So by classifying PMSC-s with this typology, Singer hopes and believes that we can explore 
not only variation within the industry but also the variation in firms’ organization, their 
operation and impact. Broader statements can be made about overall firm types, rather then 
being forced to rely on simple judgments that only apply to one specific firm (Singer 2003: 91 
– 92). However, there are some problems with his typology but I will discuss about that after I 
have described the second most significant typology developed for private military-security 
industry.  
  Kinsey on the other hand argues that private military-security companies can be 
differentiated along two axes: the means they use to secure their objective, ranging from lethal 
to non-lethal, and the object of their protection, ranging from private to public. It is important 
to understand that the axes represent only the international environment because most of the 
private military-security companies operate globally. His axes is not intended to operate on a 
scale of numbers (using the numbers to determine the level of private and public interest and 
lethality), instead the firms are plotted in relation to each other and three controlling agents as 
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“ideal types”. The controlling agents for the vertical axis are conventional police, paramilitary 
police and the army. These controlling agents represent different levels of non-lethal and 
lethal means (conventional police is seen as representing largely non-lethal means, the army 
maximum lethal means and paramilitary police is occupying the center of the axis). Public 
private partnership represents the controlling agent for the horizontal axis, occupying the 
middle of the axis. The horizontal axis represents the object to be secured. At the private end, 
the object represents anything from a private property, a commercial building, an oil refinery, 
to a mine and so on. At the other end, public authority is understood to mean the defense of 
the state [state is understood as a legal territorial entity composed of a stable population and a 
government (Dunne, Schmidt 2008: 92 – 93)]. The vertical axis represents the means of 
securing the object represented on the horizontal axis. The bottom of the vertical axis is 
represented by non-lethal means employed by companies to meet their contractual obligations 
(these are the unarmed guards found in the shopping malls in many Western countries) and 
top end of the vertical axis is represented by lethal force, again employed by companies to 
meet their contractual obligations (firm employs techniques used by army fighting a war). 
(Kinsey 2006: 10 – 11) 
  Kinsey develops six different categories companies fall into; besides, these categories are 
even more accurate and more distinctive then categories developed by Singer. However, only 
four of them are known and used extensively, so, I will only examine those four because 
others are not significant and so much used by the academic community or by the military-
security industry itself.  
  Private Military Companies (PMC) provide military expertise, including training and 
equipment, almost exclusively to weak states or failing governments facing violent threats to 
their authority. They provide local forces, which may be poorly trained and lacking in military 
competence, with customized offensive capabilities that may have strategic or operational 
advantage necessary to suppress non-state armed groups. They do this by playing an active 
role alongside the client’s force, acting as a force multiplier and they can even deploy there 
own personnel into a conflict but under strict guidelines that sees such a deployment come 
within their client’s chain of command. These companies provide business packages that 
contain all the elements their client’s require to retain the military advantage over rival forces. 
Since they are corporate bodies, they adopt business practices including the use of 
promotional literature, a vetting system for staff and a doctrine, normally represented in the 
form of company policy or culture. They are able to draw on the same support that all 
businesses can draw on, for example financial, legal, marketing and administrative support. 
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Still there personnel structure is not always clearly identifiable since companies usually retain 
only a very small permanent staff to run the office and manage the contracts. The majority of 
their workforce is drawn from networks of ex-service personnel, whose details are held on a 
database. PMCs occupy the top right-hand quadrant although this is not a common occurrence 
and has only really occurred in Africa. (Kinsey 2006: 12, 14 – 15) 
  Proxy military companies represent a subset of PMCs. A good example of a proxy company 
is MPRI, the difference with PMCs is that company has a close working relationship with its 
own government (aligning with government’s foreign policy), and the company does not 
allow its employees to be armed or take part of the combat operations. MPRI has taken on 
training roles as well as giving military assistance to foreign governments on behalf of the US 
Defense Department and it does not work for business corporations or other private interests. 
(Kinsey 2006: 15) These companies occupy the bottom right-hand quadrant of the Kinsey’s 
axes.  
  Private Security Companies (PSC) have similar corporate characteristics and control 
structures as PMCs but it is only partly true, while confusion over these two groups is easy to 
understand given the fact that both groups are founded by former soldiers, carry guns and 
adopt a tactical approach to their work. Each of these groups maintains ethical policies and 
attempt to interfere as little as possible in the political arena of the country it works for. The 
main difference between PMCs and PSCs is the range of services they provide. The tasks 
PSCs undertake range from countering fraud, risk assessment of insecure areas on behalf of 
companies evaluating investment prospects, armed guards to protect government and 
commercial installations and persons, security advisers for multinational corporations 
operating in the more volatile areas of the world and so on. (Kinsey 2006: 16) For example, 
Defense Systems Ltd (DSL) has a contract to train local Colombian forces and is protecting 
British Petroleum Exploration Colombia (BP) oil installations (The Guardian 15.04.2011). 
DynCorp has been the information technology department for countless government agencies 
including the Security and Exchange Commission, the CDC, the Federal Aviation 
Administration, the Department of State and just about every three-letter national security, 
law enforcement and defense-related agency (Ballard 2007: 51). PSCs are occupying the 
bottom left-hand quadrant of the axes and in that quadrant the security is a private commodity 
that can be purchased by anyone able to afford it.  
  Creating a category for Commercial Security Companies (CSC) is an attempt to differentiate 
between PSCs and the large publicly owned security companies that provide uniformed and 
normally unarmed guards for commercial, governmental and international organizations 
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around the world (Kinsey 2006: 18). For example, Group 4 Securicor (G4S) is a multinational 
corporation operating in 100 countries and employs as many as 340 000 full and part-time 
employees. They have used there size, corporate structure and financial position to establish 
new roles for the security industry. G4S pioneered the private contracting of detention 
facilities and prisons and they are also involved with immigration services, fire services and 
ambulance services. (Group 4 Securicor 15.04.2011) As PSCs so do commercial security 
companies occupy the bottom left-hand quadrant. 
  These two typologies, especially Kinsey’s, are helpful for every commentator who wants to 
understand the different aspects of military-security industry, however, those typologies are 
conceptual frameworks rather than fixed definitions for each and every firm in the industry. 
Some companies are clearly placed in there sectors, like G4S or BRS, but majority of firms in 
this industry lie at the sector boarders or offer a range of services within various sectors. For 
example, ArmorGroup is able to supply military training and assistance, logistical support, 
security services, geopolitical risk analysis and if asked crime prevention services through 
industry contacts, while the market for the company includes both commercial and 
governmental customers (Shearer 1998: 25 – 26). ArmorGroup is not only company with this 
kind of operational range, all the companies in this industry have the flexibility to move 
between different categories of services if they feel it would benefit their financial position in 
the long term. Nowadays it might appear that majority of companies are settled, however, in 
reality they are still carrying out operations and provide services there categorization would 
not support. For example, British company Babcock, deals mainly with engineering support 
for private sector but nevertheless it oversees the management, maintenance and repair of the 
UK’s Vanguard-class nuclear-submarines and their Tridant nuclear-missiles (Krahmann 2010: 
8). Large and known companies even use subsidiaries or other smaller companies to deal with 
contracts they can not publicly obtain. For example, Saracen Uganda, EO subsidiary, was set 
up to provide security protection for Branch Energy’s gold mining operations while EO itself 
was under the investigation in South Africa (Kinsey 2006: 29) or like L-3 Communication 
Corporation (L-3 deals mostly with IT systems, communications and so on) that has acquired 
about 60 different companies (one of which is MPRI) all from different categories and with 
different capabilities (Ortiz 2007: 66) or like DynCorp International together with McNeil 
Technologies set up Global Linguist Solutions, which is the key supplier of translators and 
interpreters for the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (Ortiz 2010: 50). Like I 
have shown we can describe this industry with different terms and typologies but they all 
point to the same phenomenon and if we analyze the reality of this industry it is quite clear 
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that those categories developed are not as absolute then they might look and because of that it 
is more convenient to use the term private military-security companies (PMSC-s) like Ortiz 
(2010: 7) does because it is the easiest way to describe the reality of this industry.  
  The post-Cold War era changed dramatically how Western countries projected military 
power. No longer is war just the prerogative of states. Of course it does not mean that state 
militaries are being marginalized or they are somehow obsolete, their role in warfare is being 
transformed and the reason for such change is more to do with efficiency, technology and 
shifting social perceptions of the role of state militaries in our new century (Kinsey 2006). For 
example, in the first Gulf War (1991) the ratio of US troops on the ground to private 
contractors was 50:1, by the second Gulf War (began in 2003) that figure had increased 
dramatically to 10:1 [some agencies even suggest 6:1 ratio (CBO 2005: 13; CBO 2008: 13)], 
as it was for the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo (Kinsey 2006: 94). So, what were the 
issues that made this extraordinary growth of significance possible for military-security 
industry? 
 
1.3 The Growth of Private Military-Security Companies 
 
  The expansion of the PMSC market is a result of a number of issues that have changed the 
way we now think about warfare. They are in part the result of a set of historical links with 
the past that has made outsourcing easier then if the link had not existed at all. For example, 
UK PMSC-s are the successors of the private violence what was used to support governments 
foreign policy during the Cold War (Africa’s wars of independence and revolutionary wars in 
Middle-East) meanwhile US government has even longer history of using the corporate world 
to assist its military (Kinsey 2006: 95), and surely it is self-evident to everybody that these 
corporate entities in the US were not in their early days selling military services but maybe 
military hard-wear or canned foods for the Army. However, nowadays there are many other 
more recent factors responsible for the growth of the industry.  
  One of the most important factors that have made this kind of growth possible is changes in 
the international situation. During the Cold War many states aligned themselves with one of 
the two superpowers, by doing that those weaker states could provide means they needed to 
protect themselves against internal subversion or external invasion. The demise of Soviet 
Union left those states which had relied on its support without a donor, while the United 
States no longer had any interest to stand behind states that fought against communist agenda 
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(socialist freedom fighters etc.) or might otherwise align themselves with the Soviet Union. 
So number of fragile states, especially in Africa, where the government possessed only 
tenuous legitimacy and limited coercive power, were forced to look for the other sources of 
security services. (Alexandra 2008: 89) The private military-security companies were first and 
maybe the only choice for those weak governments because changed geo-political situation 
exteriorized old ethnic tensions and power struggles and showed that those weak governments 
could not handle them alone.  
  This new type of organized violence that consumed Africa in 1990s and even reached 
Europe, mainly to Balkan states, is called according to M. Kaldor a „new war”. The “new 
war” is very different from wars conducted between European states in the last three centuries 
because those wars were fought between states over the rights of certain territories. “New 
wars” however are motivated by very different reasons; these wars are about identity politics, 
opposing groups are fighting for control of the state by eliminating people from society 
according to the basis of their identity. On the other hand some see “new wars” simply as a 
result of rational economic calculations; internal conflict is being escalated to war, so 
international trading networks could control through rebels and/or warlords trading of high-
priced raw materials. (Sheehan 2008: 221 – 222) The motivations for violence are not the 
only divergence with “new wars” and wars in the past, also “new wars” are conducted quite 
differently then wars from the history books because “new wars” are not fought on battlefield 
between opposing armies wearing uniforms. Instead, the battlefield is everywhere: cities, 
towns and countryside. Also the behavior of fighters in the “new wars” are rather different 
then soldiers who fight for a state military. Soldiers in the state military are fighting according 
to the laws of war; they can not commit atrocities against civilians, prisoners and destroy 
property for their own amusement, however in the case of “new wars” there are no rules 
telling a combatant how he should behave, because of that atrocities, like mass killings and 
systematic rape, against civilians are normal and enabled in the “new wars”. In this type of 
war not only the less well off people may become the victims of violence but all social groups 
within the society are affected. Because the laws and rules that govern the society are 
undermined, governments can not protect there poor and rich alike. An inability to enforce the 
law also affects multinational corporations; they can either pull their employees out or risk 
their lives if they carry on operating inside those countries. Thus, for many wealthier social 
groups in the developing world, private security has taken over as the primary source of 
protection and they are not alone; leaders of weak states have used PMSC-s to retain control 
of strategic resources (such as diamonds, oil and exotic timber) that in turn enables them to 
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marginalize threats to their rule by denying opposing strongmen revenue to purchase 
weapons. Also international organizations, intergovernmental agencies, multinational 
corporations, government agencies and even charities have come to rely on the security skills 
displayed by PMSC-s, so they can operate in “new war” areas while also protecting their 
employees and assets. (Kinsey 2006: 52, 54 – 56)  
  Since the end of Cold War, we have witnessed great reductions in military personnel. The 
United States alone reportedly downsized about 35 percent between 1989 and 2000 from the 
Army, Navy and Air Force only Marine Corps was spared (they had to reduce only 12 percent 
of their personnel). British Army reduced its military about 31.8 percent after the end of Cold 
War. However, the British or American reductions were not even closely as severe as South 
African. After the end of apartheid in 1994 entire South African military was reorganized; 
elite apartheid era units were disbanded and the new South African National Defense Force 
was integrated with troops from different liberation movements all around South Africa (all 
most none within those units had any military education). (Ortiz 2010: 52 – 53) It is not 
surprising that exactly those elite ex South African forces represented the spear-head of the 
private military-security industry in the 1990s (most famous are EO and Sandline 
International). Not only reductions in the military helped to grow private military-security 
industry, at the same time when militaries were downsized many state security and 
intelligence agencies (CIA, MI6, BOSS, KGB/FSB, Mossad and many more) were cutting 
down their expenses and because of that many specialists in possession of rare skills and 
knowledge were let go; however, not only large downsizing programs after the Cold War 
helped PMSC-s recruit specialists, for example many Israeli defense and intelligence officers 
were recruited into the industry in early 1990s but Israeli Army was not downsizing its 
manpower (Ortiz 2010: 53). So what was the other motivational tool used by the companies?  
  This motivational tool is the most common and is used actively today as well; it is of course 
money, monthly payments (salary) to be exact. During the downsizing period, many state 
militaries and agencies had to endure budget cuts and salary reductions, so this was one of the 
reasons why those who were not let go left their old state jobs and started to work in private 
sector. This problem for the states is actually increased because of the economic collapse of 
2008. Many skilled and educated officers are leaving for better wages and this is not only seen 
in Western countries but all over the world. For example, contractors who were hired to train 
Iraqi police were earning up to three times what regular police officer were making in the 
United States and wages for South Africans were even higher (police officer in the United 
States is paid approximately $50.000 yearly, in Iraq contractor for similar work gets about 
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$150.000) (Ortiz 2010: 54 – 55). Of course this example is taken when private military-
security industry had an Iraq “boom” but the industry policy is that contractor in the field is 
paid about three times (not always) more then he/she would make when he/she is a member of 
the state operational force but of course everybody is not employable. 
  Two set of factors generally determine employability and pay rates. The first relates to the 
source of the military, law enforcement or intelligence expertise. The second is associated 
with the level of skills and this focuses on parameters such “as the rank reached, the type of 
force or unit a recruit used to belong to, the specific functions performed, the equipment and 
weaponry mastered, field experience, security clearance level, accountability record and so 
forth”. Accordingly, former members of the Special Forces are always in demand and 
command comparatively high wages. Although the supply of any demand for particular 
services at any given time can raise or lower recruitment standards and pay rates; still many 
times the employer’s assessment of potential recruits boils down to nationality issues but not 
always. (Ortiz 2010: 54)  
  The other important factor why PMSC-s are growing is connected with technology. The 
increasing reliance on technology by Western militaries, particularly the US military, has 
made it very difficult for some sectors in the military to function without civilian support; 
operating and maintaining this sophisticated technology requires a level of expertise beyond 
that which is taught in the military colleges. For example, weapons systems like Aegis missile 
defense system and Patriot missile batteries, along with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and 
B2 bombers, to mention only some of the high-tech weapons available for NATO, all need 
civilian technicians to work (Kinsey 2006: 96). At the same time NATO is not the only one 
who increases its reliance on high-tech weaponry, all the industrial countries are incorporating 
new technologies to there defense and it looks like it will not reverse any time soon. Since the 
majority of research and development in fields such as IT is undertaken in the market place 
not by the military but by corporations, increases the military’s need for civilian technicians 
even more over the next decade. Of course military can create their own colleges for 
educating their personnel about new technologies but it will cost lot more then just 
contracting private firms to manage this type of technology.  
  So by talking about costs I have found another important factor why PMSC-s are gaining 
more ground. The cost issue is very important especially now when Western world is 
struggling to solve its financial problems and manage its “humanitarian” wars. However 
monetary efficiency is not a new idea for lowering state expenditure; the introduction of neo-
liberal economic ideas during the Reagan and Thatcher era was based on an assumption that 
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the free market could deliver public services more cost efficiently (Kinsey 2006: 96). In light 
of this, many public services were sold off to the private sector and the military were not left 
out of the process. Nowadays most of non-core functions and high-tech support is contracted 
from private firms to lower the costs for the military. However more budget cuts states 
militaries conduct the more private firms we will see operating in military affairs in Western 
state militaries but it is not all bad because like one MPRI official said, “we don’t need to 
spend all that money and effort training a fine combat soldier and have him peeling potatoes 
in combat” (Fineman 5.05.2011). If we are talking about costs we are not always talking 
about money, of course it is much efficient for the state to get qualified people to work in its 
military for less money (state does not have to spend money for their education) but the main 
reason, in my opinion, why many Western countries are willing to contract private firms, 
especially US, more and more is because of the shifting structure of modern society. 
  The concern over the use of lethal force to save strangers reflects an increasing 
determination by some Western governments to shape the global security environment, while 
accepting the reality that today the public will not tolerate troop casualties as it has done in the 
past. The body bag syndrome, as it is sometimes called, has increased the pressure on 
governments to find alternative means of carrying out security operations, especially where 
national interests are not directly at stake. For that job private military-security companies are 
ideal because it allows governments to take the credit when things go well but to avoid taking 
the blame should things go wrong. Of course the need for state military remains, like we have 
seen in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and other places. The thing what will be new is the close 
connection and adhesion between state military and PMSC-s.  
  Private military-security companies have been accused of being closely connected and 
linked with mercenaries time and time again. However, those kinds of accusations are made 
mostly emotionally and are not based on proper evidence but it does not mean that those 
accusations are somehow cast aside. Because of this kind of emotional over simplification 
debate about military-security industry is in stalemate and because of this states have not been 
able to construct and/or agree about general rules that can govern and control the industry 
world wide. So, it is extremely important to understand the differences between mercenaries 
and private military-security companies.  
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2. Differences between Mercenaries and Private 
Military-Security Companies 
 
  Today the word “mercenary” has a quite belittling meaning associated with it, despite being 
referred to as the world’s second oldest profession. It has had negative connotation for long 
time now, however, before 1960s it was not seen by the international community as a big 
legal problem because thanks to arise of nation states and their armies privatization of 
violence came to an end and with it mercenary profession. 
  In the second part of 19th century the old trading companies were emerged with states, so 
they lost there autonomy and with that their private forces because new stronger nation states 
had no reason to outsource colonial territorial management and control because they had 
developed strong bureaucracies and the illusion of patriotism to control there colonial empires 
and the natives. The industrialization of war also sought to concentrate military power under 
the authority of the state because the immense destructive capability of modern weapons 
needed to draw on the huge male population if the state was going to war.  
  The earliest formalized international laws of war in the modern state system were the Hague 
Conventions, established in the early 20th century. This convention in 1907 on Neutral Powers 
established certain legal standards for neutral parties and persons in case of war but it did not 
impose on states any obligations to restrict there citizens from working for belligerents. In 
fact, any national who chose to hire themselves out to a foreign power had committed no 
international crime and was to be treated as any other soldier serving in the military. The only 
proviso for them was that if they were fighting in a war they could not claim neutrality 
protection of there home state. (Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral 
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land 5.04.2011) This reluctance to control the actions 
of individuals was based on the philosophic distinction that held at that time: governments 
and individuals were considered to be two mutually exclusive spheres (John Stuart Mill’s 
ideas about individual and state) (Singer 2004a: 526). This kind of norm gradually 
disappeared because states understood that the actions of individuals can have major influence 
on interstate relations. The other major legal agreement about private military actors before 
the 1960s was the 1949 Geneva Convention. It created the conditions of fair treatment of 
prisoners of war (POW) but it did not ban nor controlled the private forces; so as long as 
mercenaries were part of a legally defined forces (actually meant being a member of any 
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armed paramilitary party), they were entitled to POW status and protection (Singer 2004a: 
526 – 527).  
  Because of the postcolonial experience in 1960s, the general feeling towards mercenaries 
began to turn more negative. Different mercenary units directly challenged many new state 
regimes in Africa, as well fought against United Nations (UN) in Congo and in other places 
(Singer 2004a: 527). So, international law sought to bring the practice of mercenarism under 
greater control and in 1968 the UN passed a resolution condemning the use of mercenaries 
against movements of national liberation. This resolution was later codified in the 1970 
Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States and in this declaration UN declared that every state has the duty to prevent 
organization of armed groups for incursion into other countries (Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations 5.04.2011). This new declaration actually represents a 
great advancement of international law because mercenaries became “outlawed” in a sense, 
however, in practice this law was not enforced because states were often unwilling, unable or 
just uninterested to force it (Abraham 1999: 92).  
  “As commercial enterprises PMSC-s may in a straightforwardly technical sense be 
considered mercenary organizations” (Alexandra et al 2008: 2). However, they differ from 
traditional mercenary forces considerably and before we can start analyzing the specifics of 
PMSC-s we must understand what the differences with mercenaries and PMSC-s are. Like 
always press is the one who all too often conflates private military-security companies with 
mercenaries but there are a number of features which differentiate the two.  
  The most important among these features is the corporate nature of private military-security 
companies, mercenaries however operate outside the law. The First Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Convention (established in 1977) defines mercenaries on the bases of six cumulative 
characteristics: 
(1) They are specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in a armed conflict; 
(2) They take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(3) They are motivated essentially by the desire for private gain and are promised, by or 
on behalf of a party of the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of 
that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces 
of the party; 
(4) They are neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a party to the conflict; 
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(5) They are not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and 
(6) They are not been sent by a state which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as 
a member of its armed forces 
(Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 5.04.2011). 
However, this Additional Protocol does not legislate against mercenary activity; it only 
acknowledges the existence and practices of such persons within warfare (also this document 
excludes mercenaries from the category and rights of recognized combatants and prisoners of 
war) and of course it defines mercenaries’ legal status (Goddard 2001: 32 – 33). Yet, the 
Additional Protocol is the only universal international provision in force that contains the 
definition of mercenary (Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and 
Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination 26.05.2011). Besides, 
additional explanatory remarks have been added to the Additional Protocol to highlight 
exceptions to the requirements you need to meet, to be regarded as a mercenary in a legal 
sense. These exceptions enable a broader interpretation of the cumulative requirements but 
also a means with which to legally nullify the applicability of some of the mandatory 
requirements (Goddard 2001: 33). These are: 
(1) Volunteers are excluded who enter service on a permanent or long-lasting bases in a 
foreign army, irrespective of whether as a purely individual enlistment (French 
Foreign Legion) or on arrangement made by national authorities (Swiss Guards in the 
Vatican); 
(2) Foreign advisors and military technicians are excluded even when their presence is 
motivated by financial gain. This distinction was included to recognize the very 
technical nature of modern weapons and support systems that may necessitate the 
presence of such persons for their operation and maintenance. “As long as these 
persons do not take any direct part in hostilities, they are neither combatants nor 
mercenaries, but civilians who do not participate in combat” [International Committee 
of the Red Cross. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
1)]; 
(3) This subparagraph is centered on individual remuneration and parity in payment 
between mercenaries and nation-state combatants. The focus of this condition is 
directed against the “freelance” mercenary at the individual level. No detail is made 
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against corporate payments that are in turn finalized in individual bank accounts in 
foreign countries; and 
(4) Persons are excluded who have been formally enlisted into the armed forces of the 
nation-state that they are contracted to operate within 
(Goddard 2001: 33 – 34; Gulam 2005: 10 – 11). 
So, it seams that this definition for mercenaries is quite broad enough to understand who is 
mercenary in the legal sense and who is not, however, this definition works only when a 
person can satisfy all six requirements listed in Additional Protocol, this unfortunately means 
that nobody can be convicted of being a mercenary because it is extremely difficult for any 
prosecutor to prove that defendant satisfies all of the requirements that is needed to be a 
mercenary. Thus, “any mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves 
to be shot – and his lawyer with him” (Wrigley 12.03.2012). 
  Another legal document that defines “mercenary” is the 1977 Convention of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. The 
difference with the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention is that the Convention 
seeks to legislate against mercenary activity, outlining responsibilities and obligations of 
member states towards the prohibition, prevention and judicial prosecution of mercenary 
related military activity. However, this Convention has the same inherent weakness as the 
Additional Protocol; the requirements of mercenary are verbatim to those of Additional 
Protocol, requiring that all six conditions be satisfied for the definition to be met. So, a failure 
to satisfy one requirement is again sufficient to prevent the definition from being met. 
Besides, this Convention is not universal; it is limited firstly to member states within the OAU 
and secondly to those states that have signed and ratified the Convention. (Goddard 2001: 34 
– 35)  
  In addition to those legal documents UN produced the International Convention of 1989 
against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries. The intent of this 
Convention was to establish universal law beyond the definition contained in the 1977 
Additional Protocol by specifically legislating against mercenary activity (Goddard 2001: 35). 
The Convention, containing 21 articles, seeks to: 
(1) Reinforce the existing definition of a mercenary; 
(2) Establish and define offences under the Convention for the recruitment, use, financing 
or training of mercenaries; 
(3) Establish and define mercenary actions; 
(4) Establish and define the role, responsibilities and obligations of States; 
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(5) Establish and assert the judicial responsibilities of States and referral of matters to the 
International Court of Justice if required; and 
(6) Establish universal law after the thirtieth day following receipt of the twenty second 
instrument of ratification or accession with the UN Secretary General 
(Goddard 2001: 35 – 36; International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries 18.04.2011). 
Nevertheless, there is a quite a big problem with this UN treaty. It does not matter that treaty 
came into force in September of 2001, when Costa Rica became the twenty-second country 
that signed and ratified it; main problems did not disappear. This Convention has done little to 
improve the legal confusion over private military actors in the international sphere, despite its 
intent to clarify matters. A number of commentators found that the Convention, which lacks 
any monitoring mechanism, merely added a number of vague, almost impossible to prove 
requirements that all must be met before an individual can be termed a mercenary. So, it 
contains most, if not all, of the same loopholes as Additional Protocol. (Gulam 2005: 13 – 14) 
Besides, if we start looking at the states that have ratified this Convention we will see that no 
major Power Houses of international community (US, China, Russia, France, UK, Germany 
etc.) have ratified this Convention or even attempts to ratify it. So, this should tell us a lot 
where this Convention is going, moreover, it shows us a wider lack of international political 
will pertaining to international legislation concerning mercenaries.  
  It does not matter that all of the international legislation documents are all most useless if we 
need to prosecute mercenaries; in straight legal sense mercenaries are unlawful entities 
without official combatants’ rights or status. So, they can be called bandits or even terrorists, 
if needed. In addition to this, mercenary forces are mostly composed on an ad hoc basis and 
for illicit purposes. They are volatile, dangerous and they are little concerned about their long-
term reputation and compliance with different laws. (Krahmann 2010: 6) Hence, there can not 
be any official connection with today’s private military-security companies and mercenary 
organizations.  
  By contrast, private military-security companies are legal businesses with permanent 
structures, headquarters and management. Although there are some regulation gaps in the 
industry, private military-security firms are subject to corporate and contractual law, sector 
regulations and national and international legislation in Europe and North-America. 
(Chesterman, Lehnardt 2007) It is specifically the incorporation of these businesses that has 
facilitated compliance with public laws and regulations through the assignment of corporate 
responsibility to private owners or executive boards (Krahmann 2010: 7). 
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  Some of the critics might say that how can I talk about self-regulations in this industry when 
all major companies have immunity from local criminal prosecution granted to their personnel 
in countries where their “warriors” are working. Again this is not a problem because having 
immunity in some Third World country does not stop companies for being charged in the US 
or in Europe. There are many cases where PMSC-s are being sued over negligence and tax 
evasions (like Blackwater Worldwide) (Scahill 2007). Thanks to the negative publicity 
Blackwater Worldwide had to change its name (to Xe Services LLC and again in 2011 to 
Academi) and Blackwater is not the only company who have suffered the consequences of 
reputation loss, such as CACI whose share value declined by up to 13 per cent after the US 
Army began investigating into accusations that some of CACI´s employees were implicated 
in the abuse of inmates at the Iraqi Abu Ghraib prison (BBC 5.04.2011). So we see that 
private military-security contractors are very concerned about there reputation because there 
conduct and the way they are doing business is effecting there share values on the stock 
market and there annual profits. 
  Another difference with mercenaries and private military-security contractors according to 
Singer (2004a: 532) is that mercenaries are recruited specially for one type of job (concrete 
conflict, like a conflict in Iraq or in Libya) and after they have fulfilled there contracts they 
leave. Military-security firms however recruit employees for lengthy periods or work on 
contracts not tied to any specific conflict. For example, EO moved from fighting in Angola to 
Sierra Leone and from there to Democratic Republic of Congo and always using the same 
fighting force. Unfortunately Executive Outcomes and its personnel is not the standard of 
PMSC-s because the majority of firms in the industry offer services that are inherently 
military in nature but do not participate directly in hostilities, for example they offer military 
training and advisory services or provide logistics. (Singer 2003) Of course I agree that 
majority of private contractor firms are not taking part of direct fighting like EO did in there 
African campaign but arguing that PMSC-s are not taking part of hostilities by not shooting 
anybody is a over stretch for any researcher. 
  Well, we can agree that advisors or a logistics engineers do not shoot a gun but so rarely do 
generals. Nevertheless, generals “take part in the hostilities”, as the expression in the laws of 
war goes because they are giving direct commands (for example, to shoot at the enemy, which 
is more or less equivalent to pulling the trigger themselves), they are part of the “chain of 
command” (Alexandra et al 2008). The war effort as U. Steinhoff (2008: 22) says is not only 
borne by these kinds of chains of commands but also by contractual arrangements. Like 
workers in an ammunition factory, they are not under a military command and do not take 
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there orders from the “chain of command” but if they disobey their superiors they will find 
themselves under a military tribunal. All the same, ammunition factories and their staff are 
seen under laws of war as legitimate targets because they are, obviously, part of the war effort 
(making ammunitions for soldiers on the front lines). This holds true, and even more, for 
military advisors, especially if there advice is crucial for the fighting army. As long as no 
armed conflict is going on, a hired foreign trainer, logistics engineer or advisor in the army is 
not taking part in any hostilities because there is no violent act of war. However if the 
hostilities re-emerge, his training, logistic support and advice is a part of the army and 
therefore he is taking part in hostilities. Since there contribution to the war effort is often far 
more dangerous to the enemy then a front-line soldier shooting with his rifle and they are also 
far more important from a moral point of view, it is impossible to deny there involvement in 
direct hostilities and to the war they are contracted to participate in. (Steinhoff 2008: 22 – 23)  
  The last main difference with private military-security contractors and mercenaries is that 
unlike the black market, word-of-mouth recruiting forms used earlier by mercenary groups 
(such as the veiled classified ads etc.), public application processes are used by most PMSC-s 
and they work from established databases that attempt to cover the available employee pool. 
All the companies screen potential employees for valued skill-sets and tailor there staff to 
specific mission needs. (Singer 2004a)  
  So I have shown that it is impossible to say and argue that PMSC-s are just modern 
mercenary groups created by new geo-political era following the end of Cold War, of course 
there are some similarities and connections but they do not equate. By understanding 
differences with private military-security firms and mercenaries we can discard some of the 
moral problems we might face when talking about PMSC-s. Of course, if PMSC-s are going 
to be enfranchised members of international environment there should be more efficient 
regulations world wide (unfortunately current regulations are not working as they should) and 
control mechanisms for this industry and for the personnel working there. 
  Now is the time to discuss about the legal status of private military-security companies, 
however, the term “private military-security company” does not exist within any current 
international legislation or convention. So, it is quite difficult to understand what kind of legal 
status PMSC-s have and are their actions in legal point of view altogether legitimate? 
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3. Legal Status of Private Military-Security 
Companies 
 
  It is surely known by everybody by now that PMSC-s are active in every major continent in 
the world, they have taken part in civil wars (Angola, Sierra Leone), “humanitarian” 
interventions (Bosnia, Kosovo), wars of aggression (Iraq) and anti-piracy missions (cost of 
Somalia); they have fought for governments, provided assistants and support to rebel 
(freedom fighter) groups, supported and protected international organizations and NGO-s and 
fought for the interests of international business conglomerates (Kinsey 2006: 111; 
CorpWatch 24.03.2012; Avant 2005: 9, 16 – 18). However, they are still associated with 
mercenaries, especially those companies that provide front-line support services to their 
clients. This is a continuous problem for the PMSC-s because there is no legal status for the 
term “private military-security company”; it does not exist in international legal system. 
Unfortunately for PMSC-s, the nearest comparable term is that of mercenary (Goddard 2001: 
32). Nonetheless, companies continue to challenge this designation. Through their PR-
campaigns and legal staff private military-security firms assert that they can fulfill honorable 
motives and contest just causes, moreover, they can be a stabilizing influence for legitimate 
foreign governments and other legitimate clients, not the destabilizing influence associated 
with traditional mercenary activity. It is the corporate structure and professionalism with 
military expertise that PMSC-s have publicly highlighted in an attempt to dispel any 
comparative measurements against traditional and negative connotations associated with 
mercenaries (Ortiz 2010). Still, all the money and PR-champagnes can not change the fact 
that PMSC-s operate in a legal vacuum (according to international humanitarian law). So, are 
“active” (companies that provide front-line support services) private military-security 
companies operations legitimate or have they just been tolerated because of their necessity?  
  The most significant limitation of current international legislation and convention is that it is 
outdated. There is no universal law that has been developed for PMSC-s and improved 
parallel with the growth of this industry. Also, current legislation only defines mercenary 
status; it does not say anything about what actions might be regarded as illegal and 
punishable. So, current universal law can not be applied effectively against the diversity of 
contracted operations conducted by legally registered corporate entities for legitimate foreign 
governments and other legitimate clients. (Goddard 2001: 37) This is mainly because 
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international community has failed to recognize growing importance of PMSC-s or they do 
not actually see the need to develop universal legislation for them, yet.  
  The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention is the only universal legislation, like 
we saw in previous chapter, which deals with private violence; it defines the term 
“mercenary” that is the closest term to the private military-security company in international 
legal system. Other international legal documents (OAU and UN Conventions) have tried to 
establish criminal law; however, they do not work. They have utilized the Additional Protocol 
definition of a mercenary as a basis of their documents (of course this in not the only problem 
with these documents and I discussed those problems in previous chapter), the original 
limitations and weaknesses contained within the Additional Protocol are further exacerbated 
within these two Conventions (Goddard 2001: 37 – 38). So, that is why I do not deal with 
those Conventions, only with Additional Protocol and its most significant limitations. These 
limitations are: 
(1) The lack of a generally acceptable and operational definition of the concept of 
mercenaries for application within modern warfare; 
(2) The cumulative and concurrent requirements to satisfy the definition of a mercenary; 
(3) The narrow focus on the status of the individual conducting an action, as opposed to a 
wider focus on the act of direct intervention in armed conflict as a combatant; and 
(4)  The lack of any fundamental differentiation between corporate entities conducting 
military-style operations and traditional freelance style mercenaries 
(Goddard 2001: 38; Solis 2010: 123). 
Yet, the most fundamental weakness is that if you do not satisfy all six requirements of the 
mercenary definition, it can not legally come into force. Those limitations are used 
extensively in military-security industry to fight against accusations and prove to the world 
that their actions/operations are not similar to the mercenary activity, even if previous chapter 
already showed that it is very difficult to equate those two with one-another, however, 
legitimacy problem still remains.  
  Executive Outcomes was one of the first companies in military-security industry that 
exploited the exception in Additional Protocol (mentioned in previous chapter) that enables 
foreign advisors and military technicians to be excluded from the definition of being a 
mercenary. 
  EO was established in 1989 after the white-dominated South African government was 
replaced with Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress and many senior officers of South 
African Defense Forces were let go. Using links to South African military community and 
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officers who still remained active, new company quickly won a contract to train new Special 
Forces units of the completely renovated South African military. Also EO won a contract 
from diamond mining company De Beers to investigate diamond thefts. (Davis 2002: 124) 
However, these are not the contracts that made this private company famous. In early 1993 
EO was contracted by the Angolan government to fight UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a 
Independencia Total do Angola) rebels that had in that time control over four-fifths of the 
country and because of the seriousness of the situation Angolan government agreed to pay 
$40 million a year to EO, half of the fee was for weapons and equipment purchases and the 
remainder for EO’s expense (Davis 2002: 128). In Angola EO understood that they need to 
find a way to distinguish themselves from mercenaries, so through PR-campaigns and lawyers 
they showed that their most active participants in Angola were just trainers and military 
technicians (Adams 25.06.2012). It was easy because thanks to the Angolan governments’ 
money and request EO created an air force with all the technical support this kind of military 
branch needs to operate effectively. So, it was not so difficult to show that its personnel in 
Angola were only there for training and maintaining planes, of course this was not entirely 
true because these trainers were allowed to carry out preemptive strikes against rebel units 
(Adams 25.06.2012). Besides, the situation for reporters and activists against the EO was 
made even more complex because of the location of their success. Angola had led the world 
charge against private violence only twenty year earlier and had signed the 1989 UN 
Convention against mercenary activity (Davis 2002: 131); also EO had been extremely 
successful in support of a legitimate government and thanks to the EO’s involvement 
previously ignored peace accord was finally signed. So those journalists, activists and 
politicians against EO had no “ammunition” to criticize EO’s activities in Angola and because 
of that EO’s reputation improved even farther. That is why EO became a “poster-boy” of the 
military-security industry and its methods were widely copied by other companies in this 
industry. 
  Similarly, Sandline International has exploited the wide parameters of the Additional 
Protocol. According to one of the exceptions, foreign citizens that are formally enlisted into 
the armed forces of the nation-state that they are contracted to operate within are not 
considered to be mercenaries.  
  Sandline International was established in early 1990s and its purpose is to offer governments 
and other legitimate organizations specialist military expertise at a time when Western 
national desire to provide active support to friendly governments, and to support them in 
conflict resolution, has materially decreased, as has their capability to do so. Sandline is 
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incorporated in Bahamas but has representative offices in London and in Washington D.C. 
(Sandline International 25.04.2012) Like, EO in Angola, so did Sandline start to think about 
its reputation. In Papua New Guinea according to Tim Spicer (former CEO of Sandline 
International) all the Sandline people were appointed to Special Constables and were subject 
to same laws, rules and regulations that governed any other government servant, Sandline in 
Papua New Guinea was not operating as private army; besides he argued that Sandline is 
always enrolled in the forces, police or military, of the client country (Spicer 1999: 24). Of 
course, it is hard to believe, especially when this was the company that was accused of 
smuggling illegal weapons to Sierra Leone (it will be discussed later).  
  Despite the little differences in their legal tactics, both companies (EO and Sandline) and 
many other private military-security companies have also exploited the parameters that talk 
about financing. No client of private military-security company is entering into contractual 
agreement with the employee of this industry, payments are made directly to the company (it 
is always for the total package of services provided by PMSC to its client) and companies are 
the ones that decide the amounts (according to contracts made between company and 
employee) and pay wages to their employees; therefore it is very difficult to make any 
effective and succinct comparison concerning the rates of payment between contract 
employees and personnel within the armed forces of the host nation (Goddard 2001: 40).  
  In addition to the framework of the legislation itself, another fundamental limitation is the 
distinct lack of political will for legislation to be actively incorporated into force within the 
international realm. This problem exists because very few major powers have interested in 
promoting these laws and conventions that deal with this problematic and unregulated issue in 
the international realm, of course because PMSC-s have been utilized by governments within 
the West as discrete and measured exponents with which to execute foreign policy. (Goddard 
2001: 41) Besides, not only governments have started to use PMSC-s extensively to achieve 
their aims, many other entities in the international environment use and protect military-
security industry because world is not as safe as it was in decade ago.  
  The UN Convention, we mentioned in previous chapter, is focused on a mercenary actions 
that are perceived to be a means of violating human rights and impending the exercise of the 
rights of peoples to self-determination. This focus has centered on events in Africa and other 
parts of the Third World. Nobody considered the potential, when this document was written, 
that discrete relationship can exist between a PMSC and its national government and their 
other legitimate clients in other parts of the world. (Goddard 2001: 41) 
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  The government of the United States has a quite intimate and overt relationship with US 
based private military-security companies. Many worlds’ biggest and well known private 
military-security companies reside in US, however, US government always stated that it has 
no official and legal control over privately owned and operating companies. According to one 
of the State Department officials PMSC-s are as free to sell their services as US car 
manufacturers selling their cars (Solis 2010). However, PMSC-s are not as free as it first 
seems (of course US car manufacturers need a business license too and government is the one 
that writes them), all of their operations over seas need a license from the Department of 
State. Therefore all PMSC-s that reside in US and provide services over seas are in fact 
operating with the consent of the US government. It is exactly this linkage to government that 
has led some academic quarters to assert that private military-security companies have 
“quietly taken a central role in the exporting of security, strategy and training of foreign 
militaries--it’s a tool for foreign policy in a less public way” (Brown 12.06.2012). Even some 
of the companies have affirmed this suspicion. One of the companies’ spokespersons (MPRI) 
told that US government (referring to Clinton administrations “Plan Columbia”) is using 
PMSC-s to carry out American foreign policy; “we [private military-security firms] certainly 
do not determine foreign policy, but we can be part of the US government executing its 
foreign policy” (Garza, Adams 12.06.2012).  
  Another perspective is that the development of PMSC-s has enabled governments to commit 
to foreign crises while avoiding the publicly sensitive issue of potentially sustaining troop 
casualties on missions other than war-fighting (Goddard 2001: 42). This kind of convenience 
may and will give governments the leverage they need to overcome the political reluctance to 
become involved in situations where risk is high for its troops and objectives are very hard to 
sell to its domestic electorates because government can deploy private contractors and deny 
any involvement with them. For example in 1998, DynCorps was awarded a contract to 
provide civilian verification monitors to the NATO monitoring group in Kosovo while other 
contributing nations provided officers from their armed forces (Goddard 2001: 42).  
  Most known private military-security company that is very closely connected with US 
government is Blackwater (now Academi). This company was formed in 1997 by Erik Prince 
in North Carolina, to provide training support to military and law enforcement organizations. 
It got its first governmental contract after the bombing of the USS Cole off the coast of 
Yemen in 2000, company had to provide safety for the sailors of the US Navy and train there 
anti-terrorist crews on ships to spot and destroy suspected terrorist boats that might attack US 
ships and its personnel. (Academi 15.07.2012) After that Balckwater became a consistent 
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partner of the US government, supporting and protecting its officials in Afghanistan and Iraq 
[for example in 2003 Balckwater attained one of its major contracts when it won a $27.7 
million no-bid contract for guarding the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority Paul 
Bremer (Blackwater USA: Building the 'Largest Private Army in the World 15.07.2012)], 
equipping its military and federal agencies in different crises zones [Balckwater also was 
hired during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina by the DHS, as well as by private clients, 
including communications, petrochemical and insurance companies (Sizemore 15.07.2012)] 
and so on. Overall, the company has received over $1 billion in US governments contracts 
(Balckwater’s rich contracts 15.07.2012). Most of the contracts are somehow connected with 
Iraq but not all of them, for example Balckwater employees were helping to command and 
control different rebel units in East Libya, besides they where evolved with not only training 
rebel units but actively fighting against Gaddafi’s regime as well (Libya: blood bonanza for 
contractor 17.07.2012). Already from the beginning of Iraq war Balckwater was accused of 
committing many crimes against civilians and it is not surprising because its employees have 
been involved in 195 shootings incidents; in 163 of those cases Balckwater personnel fired 
first, however, nobody has prosecuted the company or its personnel (some have been fired but 
nothing more), maybe because like Erik Prince points out, his company and its employees 
followed the orders of United Sates governments officials, who have frequently put 
Blackwaters personnel in harms way (Balckwater boss grilled over Iraq 17.07.2012).  
  Of course Balckwater is not the only company that has been used by the US government. In 
1996 MPRI was contracted to equip and train the Bosnian Croat-Muslim Federation to fight 
and protect itself against other forces in the war of disintegration of Yugoslavia (Kinsey 
2006). Actually, unstated central issue was that because of the neutrality of the US 
government it could not send any troops or equipment to Bosnian Croats because it would 
significantly damaged US reputation and made the US officially part of this conflict; so, 
MPRI was contracted by the US government to go and discretely execute US foreign policy 
(Goddard 2001: 43). Same kind of contract was given to MPRI some years later, again US 
government had no soled arguments to sell its military expansion plans to the public, and so, 
it again used private contractors. In Colombia MPRI has to provide training and equipment to 
the Columbian military, so they can fight the rebels and drug traffickers; besides that MPRI 
employees have to provide mission support services as well, this means that their personnel 
has to go and fight along side with Columbian army (Ortiz 2010). It is understandable that by 
using private contractors US government is saving some money and lives of its military and 
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other security agents (because of the body-bag syndrome in the society it needs to reduce 
casualties) but at the same time achieves some of its foreign policy objectives.  
  Also the government of United Kingdom (UK) exercises practical judgment in how it has 
categorized the legal standing of PMSC-s; it has especially happened with Sandline and its 
involvement in Sierra Leone (Goddard 2001: 44). When the conflict started in Sierra Leone in 
1991, Sierra Leonean government had no power to stop RUF that immediately began a 
program of intimidation and fear, they attacked everybody (farmers, miners, villagers etc.) 
killing, raping and mutilating (arms were amputated with machetes, people burned alive) 
people. Because of governments ill-equipped, poorly led army Sierra Leonean president J. 
Momoh turned to Britain for help, Sierra Leone had been for many years’ British protectorate 
and navy base in West Africa, however, military aid was turned down by the British 
government. (Davis 2002: 133) British government had exactly the same problems as did the 
US government. So because of that UK government stated that if some legitimate government 
needs to use private contractors it should have the chance because those companies can 
provide security and professional staff to reform ill-equipped militia into modern fighting 
force (Guru-Murthy 18.07.2012). Again the central issue of the acceptance of the PMSC-s 
involvement in those kinds of conflicts is the role they play in lessening the requirement for 
direct intervention by less committed but more capable nation-states (Goddard 2001: 44). So, 
by not sending its troops to fight UK’s government could stay neutral but at the same time 
covertly increase its influence in Western Africa and elsewhere because British nationals were 
the ones that introduced EO and Sandline to those African and other Third World nations that 
needed military professionals to protect their countries.  
  Both countries domestic law also reflects a stance that is alternate to the intent of the 
Additional Protocol and the UN Convention, they only prohibit the recruitment of 
mercenaries and the actual conduct of mercenary activities (Sheehy et al 2009: 137) but 
PMSC-s are not mercenaries, they are privately owned commercial entities. 
  Besides legitimate governments many other legitimate entities are contracting the help from 
private military-security companies. International organizations like UN, OSCE, World Bank 
and etc. have hired private military-security companies to help them achieve there goals in 
under-developed countries and these organizations are not alone because NGO-s and many 
charities have understood that they need security if they are working in those insecure 
environments like Iraq, Afghanistan, Congo, Sudan and so on. Of course IO-s and NGO-s 
have different reasons why they hire PMSC-s to help them with there work. For example in 
2004, the director of Care International in Iraq was kidnapped and murdered; at least dozen 
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people involved of mine clearance in Afghanistan have been assassinated; in Philippines at 
least three Red Cross workers were kidnapped in 2009 and it has only worsened, because 
those days when humanitarians were respected by both sides are long gone and as the field 
becomes more dangerous, it is understandable that NGO-s and charities require risk advice 
and management from PMSC-s to get there relief workers to the distressed areas and protect 
them and there equipment (Ortiz 2010: 87). IO-s on the other hand understand outsourcing 
little bit differently then NGO-s or charities, of course their workers need security as well and 
they are as vulnerable as relief workers from NGO-s but motives are regrettably connected 
with costs. The UN approved budget for peacekeeping to June of 2009 (from 1st of July 2008) 
was $7.1 billion: about twice the amount spent in 1993, which back then was considered 
unprecedented (United Nations General Assembly 16.02.2012). There were about 91 000 
Blue Helmets involved in 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations around the world in 2009 
(Ortiz 2010: 85), and if we are considering international situation today it is quite probable 
that this figure will increase even further. However, not only UN is connected with 
peacekeeping and peace managing operations in the world. There are many IO-s besides UN 
that deal with developing countries and war thorn areas of the world, for example OSCE has 
about 20 field operations in Europe and former Soviet republics, including Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova and Georgia (Ortiz 2010: 86), and of course not only UN but 
many others have financial troubles to maintain and set up their operations. The problem is 
not only the increasing costs to conduct humanitarian operations but thanks to the financial 
crisis many Western countries have reduced their annual payments to organizations that deal 
with relief and/or peacekeeping and peace managing. So, many IO-s have started to look for 
alternatives and/or partners to reduce their costs to their members but at the same time they 
still want to achieve their operational objectives.  
It is understandable that they found their partners from private military-security industry 
because the delivery of services in high risk environments requires military or security 
expertise to accomplish the contracted tasks and PMSC-s are only ones (with the exception of 
states) that are capable of providing such services to their clients. Although humanitarians are 
among the fiercest critics of the industry and their increasing role in the relief business, 
however, they have understood that without PMSC-s they are not capable of helping the 
people in need in the Third World or in places that have suffered some kind of catastrophe. 
Actually it is not the first time that PMSC-s have started to work closely with the 
humanitarian organizations. But before 21st century private military-security firms were not 
taken seriously because humanitarians were not capable of understanding how PMSC-s can 
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help locals in the war zone. EO was the first that showed that they can help locals’ even more 
than humanitarian organizations from the West. In Angola and Sierra Leone EO purified 
water for the local villages and built local medical facilities were locals could receive medical 
attention and medicines that were too expensive for humanitarian organizations do deliver. Of 
course EO was not doing this just because they felt good about it; it was a tactical maneuver 
to get locals to support their troops. Besides, in April 1994 EO produced plans for UN to 
intervene in the Rwanda conflict as the genocide started to unfold, they only asked about $100 
million for six-month operation, unfortunately UN rejected the plan and spent (after genocide) 
nearly half a billion dollars during its assistance mission for Rwanda. (Ortiz 2010: 89 – 91, 
Kinsey 2006: 129 – 130) Of course it is futile to speculate whether EO would have been 
successful but it shows that PMSC-s were prepared to undertake humanitarian relief missions 
already in early 1990s. 
  It is understandable why different NGO-s and IO-s that once were critical of private 
military-security companies operations now have become supporters of this industry, of 
course mainly because of practical and fiscal reasons but we can not forget the decreased 
interests and capabilities of states. However, it does not mean that they have forgotten the 
legal problems of private military-security companies.  
  The measurement of international legitimacy afforded to PMSC-s evolves from their legal 
status in accordance with the 1977 Additional Protocol. The private military-security 
companies and nation-state governments have exploited the inherent limitations and 
weaknesses within the outdated framework of this legislation and governments are not the 
only ones, like we saw in this chapter. These legally registered corporate entities selling 
military expertise have produced their own understanding of legitimacy because of the 
absence of a definitive legal determination within the international realm and they are further 
reinforced by their legitimate clients (from national governments to NGO-s and legally 
registered multinational corporations). (Goddard 2001: 47) It seams that operations conducted 
by private military-security companies that provide active military assistance are somewhat 
legitimate, this because PMSC-s services are been sold only to legitimate clients that provide 
by using those services some legitimacy to the providers of those services. However, in strict 
legal sense, private military-security companies and their activities can not be regarded as 
legitimate; it can be achieved only when the entity is legally defined in a proper universal 
legislation. Unfortunately, military-security industry has not had this proper legal 
acknowledgment (Sheehy et al 2009). Nevertheless private military-security companies are 
the cornerstones of our international security environment because no legitimate actor in the 
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international community is ready to discard private military-security industry and the services 
they provide.  
  So, we have seen that in the strict legal sense PMSC-s operations (especially those that 
provide front-line support services) are not legitimate but does this mean that there is no 
workable regulatory system that can regulate those commercial entities and can we find 
someone that is accountable when international rules of conduct and/or laws are broken?  
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4. Regulating Private Military-Security Companies 
 
  Regulation is a controversial topic and even the meaning of “regulation” is disputed in legal 
and political sphere. This controversy comes from the philosophical commitments it reflects, 
not only with respect to economics, social policy and social philosophy but also because of 
the views of constitutionalism it entails. As to the first set of disputes, scholars and legislators 
committed to neo-liberal views see any regulatory methods as an attack against the free-
market; however, scholars and legislators who prefer social democracy believe that markets, 
like many other parts of society, function better with some level of regulation. The other 
controversial issue with regulation is connected with constitutional law, which governmental 
branch should control and supervise the regulations. (Sheehy et al 2009: 110 – 111) Despite 
all of this controversy and dispute, one thing is clear, total free market in private military-
security industry would be same as a Hobbes all-out war of all against all, while at the 
opposite extreme, total governmental control of all aspects of security matters, is as 
problematic and may harm its citizens. So, the regulatory methods for private military-
security industry should place us somewhere in the middle of this scale. 
  Because of the “arms to Africa” affair governments started to understand that private 
military-security industry needs some kind of official regulations, of course, this affair in 
Africa was not the only reason but it is one of the most known because of the press coverage 
and government investigations.  
  In 1997 Sierra Leonean democratically elected President T. Kabbah was removed from 
power and exiled by a coup. Regardless of new government, AFRC (Armed Force 
Revolutionary Council), Kabbah was still regarded in international community as the 
legitimate head of state. Because of this in August of 1997 the leaders of ECOWAS 
(Economic Community of West African States) imposed sanctions on petroleum products, 
arms imports and international travels to AFRC and through UN Security Council Resolution 
1132 United Nations had also adopted sanctions on weapons and other military equipment, 
petroleum and its products to the country. However UN Resolution 1132 was not explicitly 
clear who were the parties in the conflict that had to be embargoed. The problem with the 
resolution was its formulation, it only referred to Sierra Leone not to the parties involved in 
the conflict and because of this mishap this resolution could be construed in number of 
different ways. So, thanks to the formulation of the resolution, what talked about the 
geographical Sierra Leone, not about the parties involved in the conflict, Kabbah started to 
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build up its new fighting force to repel the AFRC/RUF junta from Freetown and the Kono 
diamond mines, for that he needed professional help. Shortly after the resolution was accepted 
and functioning Kabbah met with the representative (gentleman from London) from Sandline 
International and asked military assistants. The contract with Kabbah and Sandline 
International stated that Sandline would train and equip the new Civil Defense Force and 
provide assistants on operations, also Sandline equipped and helped ECOWAS troops that 
supported Kabbah’s government in exile. So in early 1998 Sandline International transported 
about 1,000 AK 47s, mortars, light machine-guns and ammunition from Bulgaria to Lagos, 
were aircraft was refueled with ECOMOG’s (Economic Community of West African 
Monitoring Group) assistance for the next sector to Lungi airport. The method Sandline used 
to broker the weapons was not the typical method used for illegal transfers of weapons. At no 
stage did the company appear to hide the transfer of weapons from anybody, so for Sandline 
International everything in their contract with Kabbah was legal. (Kinsey 2006: 74 – 77, 79)  
  However, according to the UK’s government Sandline International was violating UN 
Security Council Resolution 1132 by transporting arms to Kabbah’s supporters. Yet this affair 
was not as simple as it looked at first. For the British government UN Resolution 1132 was 
clear, it applied to all parties to the conflict and because of that the scope was geographical 
instead of being specific. However, the confusion over the meaning of the resolution was 
further exacerbated by the way in which the FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) 
glossed over its meaning to its own Parliament, the media and to the exiled government of 
President Kabbah. Even in there official telegrams and daily bulletins the FCO officials only 
referred to the Junta not to Kabbah’s exiled government and because of that only the Junta 
was mentioned to be under the embargo at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
in October 1997. Furthermore, UK’s Minister of FCO stated during the debate in the House of 
Commons in March 1998 that UN Resolution 1132 was against the AFRC/RUF junta not 
against Kabbah’s government. The legal problems came when Parliament officially made the 
violation of the embargo an offence, punishable by up to seven years in prison but the official 
document Parliament approved was not the original UN Resolution 1132 but draft from Order 
in Council (legal council in the UN that clarifies the resolutions) that defined the parties in the 
conflict, so according to this document both the junta and Kabbah’s government were under 
the embargo. So when this affair came public, thanks to the reporters, British government’s 
senior officials and politicians were accused of violating the embargo with Sandline 
International and because of that governmental investigation was initiated. (Kinsey 2006: 75 – 
77, 80 – 81) In the end Sandline International and senior civil servants were exculpated but 
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governments now understood that some regulatory methods must be engineered to regulate 
the private military-security industry to avoid those kinds of accusations, protect involved 
corporations and governments and reduce critics “ammunition” against private military-
security industry. 
  From legal perspective, the PMSC is not different from any other business corporation in 
that it has the same structure, rights, duties and obligations. It is controlled by the board of 
directors, has shareholders who hope to receive dividends from corporate profit and engages 
in activity solely for the purpose of making a profit (Sheehy et al 2009: 35). So, is it possible 
to regulate PMSC like we do with other business corporation? 
  First, before starting to use corporate law for regulating private military-security company’s 
activity, we must understand the various rights and duties of the business corporation and its 
participants. Of course, there are number of different ideas and ideologies that tell us how the 
corporations must be regulated, some theories even suggest that any corporate regulation is 
against economic free market and freedom of choice, so it will be extremely difficult to 
examine all of those regulative ideas, thus we should only examine the laws that regulates the 
activities of corporate participants. Those main corporate participants are the directors and 
shareholders. Yet, we must understand that corporations have the same rights and protections 
as people but, unfortunately, thanks to the insufficient corporate law, they are without clear 
responsibilities (as you will learn next); as a result, they operate freely and unrestrained, 
especially financial giants controlling the power of money at the public’s expanse (Lendman 
16.12.2011).  
  Every jurisdiction has its own set of laws dealing with directors’ duties but some reasonable 
generalizations can be made; directors have two basic duties in the main common law and 
civil law jurisdiction: a duty of loyalty and the duty of care. The duty of loyalty is a fiduciary 
duty, meaning that it requires good faith in its execution and breach of fiduciary duties may 
give rise to the broader equitable remedies then those available under contract. The directors 
are constrained to act as fiduciaries focused on the economic well-being of the company, 
without regard of shareholders, employees and other civilians. The duty of loyalty precludes 
for example, self-dealing and requires directors to avoid conflicts of interests, it is a 
jurisprudential doctrine based on trust rather then economics. The duty of care is a non-
fiduciary duty, associated with general law principles or statute. It is a duty to use due and 
proper care in the execution of one’s responsibilities, it does not, however, require the 
directors be correct in there decisions, even if they had all the information saying that the 
direction they are taking is wrong and harmful for the company. Indeed, the Business 
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Judgment rule is specifically designed to protect directors from liability for decisions taken 
which prove to be unsuccessful and the only way to punish those directors is with a fine or by 
replacing them, of course if prosecutor can prove that directors have broken some major law 
with there activity they can be sent to prison but it is not an easy task. In the terms of PMSC, 
this duty and the Business Judgment Rule would lead one to suggest that the matter before the 
director is limited in consideration to the economic good of the company. A decision, for 
example, to move the business of the PMSC to provide front line tip-of-the-spear service to 
governments, multinational corporations and so one, adds no special liability to the director 
for whatsoever harm or social costs that may ensue. The net effect of these narrowly focused 
duties is that directors, unlike military personnel, have no incentive to consider the potentially 
lethal outcomes of strategic decisions. (Sheehy et al 2009: 43 – 44) 
  Shareholders rights and duties are, in contrast with directors, quite constrained. Still there are 
some means available for the shareholders to direct the company’s strategy; they can vote for 
directors, residual claims and of course they have some limited liability but this limited 
liability means that they would be liable solely for the amount of capital they were willing to 
put at risk, so by this legal innovation, shareholders have no liability for the actions or 
obligations of the corporation, regardless of whether those obligations are to voluntary 
creditors or to involuntary tort victims. In the terms of PMSC, the shareholder has little to fear 
and considerable reason for hope because thanks to dramatic growth of the industry and the 
limited liability of the corporation. (Sheehy et al 2009: 45) 
  Since the inception of corporations, various parties have sought to control them, however, it 
has never fully achieved, and even the most totalitarian regimes have to recognize the 
independents of these commercial entities. It is understandable, because of the intensely 
political nature of the corporate regulation debate; there are many conflicting ideas about 
corporate regulation; for example, some free-market believers reject any regulatory methods 
for economic entities and others, more critical about unregulated free-market, believe that this 
is the only way to protect the society against the greed of commercial corporate entities 
(Sheehy et al 2009: 53). So, this is why corporate law is concerned with the regulation of the 
internal structure of the corporation, the rights and duties of shareholders and directors. 
Unfortunately these regulations, like we have seen, are not adequate to protect us against 
corporate misbehavior and the Western corporate law needs to be improved to achieve the 
Common Good. Of course there are some very good recommendations, for example, every 
commercial corporation has to give its government the “Golden Shears”, these shears permit 
the government to maintain some fundamental controls over a corporation but these shears are 
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simply voting shears and do not have equity rights, so the government does not have to think 
about the money and profits when it votes; secondly, we should set standards to be required 
from corporate directors, these standards would require knowledge of more then business or 
military matters (like in the case of PMSC-s), they should understand the laws governing war 
and human rights and apart from those laws they should know environmental and moral 
concerns there profit margins may cause for the society at whole; thirdly, we may issue the 
law that changes the board composition, namely every corporation needs to have a non-
business personnel, humanitarian or governmental representative, to ensure at least 
compliance with the minimal norms of international law (Sheehy et al 2009: 60, 63 – 64). 
Regrettably those are only recommendations not the laws. So, we have seen that corporate 
law is not the best mechanism for regulating PMSC-s and it is understandable because today’s 
corporate law could not even sufficiently regulate ordinary corporate entities and trusts. For 
example, in the Enron bankruptcy case, hundreds of investors lost their money but the Wall 
Street financial institutions, like J.P. Morgan Chase, Merrill Lynch, Deutsche Bank etc., not 
only knew about the misconduct of Enron but they themselves designed some of the 
fraudulent documents to profit from Enron’s misbehavior and in the end no investment banker 
got in trouble when it came out and banks did not have to pay any of their profits back to the 
investors that they knowingly defrauded. (McLean, Elkind 2003). Yet, some kind of 
regulatory method most be used to regulate PMSC-s.  
  It is quite understandable that lot of citizens instantly believe that states must have the 
responsibility to regulate commercial corporate entities but we have seen that even if they 
regulate they might not get the outcomes they wished. So, before we look at the most known 
state regulation acts, we should look at the self-regulation in the private military-security 
industry.  
  Self-regulation is not a new idea (it has been used by other industries for years); however, it 
is a model that has become increasingly popular for a number of reasons. Participants in the 
industry are deemed to be the most knowledgeable about the challenges and proper practice of 
their particular occupation and hence argue that they are in the best position to design 
implementation and administration of the regulation. Furthermore, it is considered to be 
cheaper because government does not only avoid the cost involved in creating the regulation, 
it also avoids the costs of funding administration of the regulation. (Sheehy et al 2009: 112) 
Besides that, industries themselves are quite keen to self-regulate because of number of 
reasons. Firstly, it helps industry deal with industry-wide problems such as problems with 
public image; distinguishes its goods and services from competition; helps defeat undesirable 
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pending government regulation; helps to marginalize consumer collective actions and helps 
develop cooperation with different companies inside the industry to enhance profits from 
limiting competition in the market (Gunningham et al 1998: 159 – 163).  
  One of the main problems with the private military-security industry is its image; the 
problem is that public is not accepting the industries legitimacy claims and activities of 
PMSC-s. Nevertheless, using the public relations “wizards” industry has significantly 
improved its image by emphasizing its potential benefits. They have used different methods, 
like naming there industry association International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), at 
the same time they are emphasizing there support to humanitarian ends and condemning 
“Ruthless Humanitarianism” (humanitarian aid and peace only through political process); 
they have even emphasized loyalty to national foreign policy and to patriotism. Despite some 
problems with there image, they have been extremely successful with distinguishing there 
services and goods from there competitors (mercenaries and government) and cooperating 
among themselves. Therefore, by doing that they have enhanced the safety of their members’ 
employees in the field and obtaining larger contracts by coordinating the supply of services. 
So, when questions about regulation appeared in the debate, IPOA itself became the main 
supporter of the regulation because its members knew that the growth and unregulated nature 
of the PMSC industry is causing governments, the public and users of security services to 
become nervous. Of course industry quickly used its associations to construct voluntary 
regulatory code of conduct for its members and sponsored the development of Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights which governs the dealings with PMSC-s. (Sheehy 
et al 2009: 112 – 113)  
  So, it seems that through self-regulatory methods private military-security industry has the 
ability to control its member’s behavior because the code of conduct constructed for PMSC-s 
does not change when company chances its legal jurisdictions, for example moves from US to 
Kuwait. Is this the regulatory method we have been searching for and can this self-regulation 
work for private military-security industry? 
  Problems, however, with self-regulation is that it must address three particular challenges to 
be successful. First self-regulation tends to be inappropriate and ineffective the larger the 
group and furthermore, self-regulation tends to be difficult and/or ineffective unless 
consumers or peers can identify and punish breaches of code (Purchase 2004: 81 – 82). 
Finally, self-regulation is only appropriate in that “minority of cases in which industry 
interests and public interest are sufficiently coincident for self-regulation to be a viable 
regulatory strategy” (Gunningham et al 1998: 159). Unfortunately, problem here is that 
 52
private military-security industry, with its self-regulatory methods, is unable to be accordance 
with those three principles. So, what are the problems? First of all, private military-security 
industry wishes to avoid any kind of prosecution of its members. Besides that, the industry is 
extremely large. It is quite complicated to say how many PMSC-s there are because there are 
no solid databases but some claim that there are several hundred companies globally, 
operating in over one hundred countries on six continents (Singer 20.12.2011).  
  Thanks to the nature of its business, it is a secretive industry and because of the lack of 
information, it is not a good candidate for self-regulation at all and as to the coalescence of 
public interest and private interest one must note that while one party wants free peace and 
safety, the other party is prepared to engage in violence for profit. Even further, there is no 
industry body that has an enforcement mechanism with a degree of independents and 
substantial penalties to back those voluntary regulations that industry has developed. For 
example, the most widely used Code of Conduct in the industry is IPOA’s (the largest 
association of the industry), however, like most voluntary industry codes, it is written in very 
general terms and is not enforceable in any meaningful way. There is no complaint 
mechanism in the Code, which decreases the likelihood that any breach of the Code will be 
reported. There is also no mention of a compliance officer or a regular audit process and if the 
member breaches the Code then the only sanction they face is being dismissed from the 
IPOA. So, if the private military-security industry wishes to implement an effective voluntary 
regulatory regime it will need to revise the Code by removing the words “to the extent 
possible and subject to contractual and legal limitations” and introduce a requirement to abide 
by international law and international humanitarian law and that Code would need to be 
further amended such that members would be prohibited from entering into a contract that is 
contrary to the Code. It is simply not acceptable for PMSC-s to argue that they are effectively 
self-regulated if they are not obligated to follow international humanitarian law and human 
rights or not to abide by their code of conduct if it conflicts with their contractual obligations. 
Unfortunately, even the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, developed by 
governments, international corporations and NGO-s but sponsored by the industry, could not 
help the case for self-regulation inside the private military-security industry because like the 
Code, it is written with no attempts to draft clauses that could be interpreted in a legal sense 
and of course it has no enforcement mechanisms or sanctions found in the text. (Sheehy et al 
2009: 114 – 118) So, again we see that this regulatory method is not suitable for private 
military-security industry and that is why we need the compulsory regulation for this military-
security industry.  
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  Those specialists who are arguing against state regulation of PMSC-s place great emphasis 
on the fact that PMSC-s are subject to the same laws as every other citizen, who works for the 
state, same state that is governed by the Rule of Law. So, by that logic, PMSC-s are already 
regulated by states as any other corporate citizen. However, we saw that this kind of corporate 
regulation is ineffective and it does not only work for PMSC-s, also, it does not work for any 
corporate entity (especially multinational business conglomerates). Furthermore, those people 
that are opposing PMSC regulation would argue that the time and cost involved in 
establishing an effective PMSC regulatory regime is unjustified both in terms of the risk 
posed by PMSC-s and the benefits that will accrue to the state; they even emphasize the 
markets ability to regulate, through its competitive forces, constraints and incentives (Sheehy 
et al 2009: 120). However, those people against regulation of PMSC-s should know that 
companies themselves and the IPOA is calling for regulation, maybe because through 
government regulation there right to exist is acknowledged. Companies know that regulated 
industry is good for business but it is important not do let governments regulate too much of 
their industry. 
  The arguments in favor of greater state regulation of PMSC-s can be reduced to simple 
propositions: first, some states are concerned that private military-security companies can be 
involved in unsanctioned acts of violence or aggression. Governments need to look only to the 
recent past to document a huge quantity of inappropriate PMSC activities, like Sandline’s 
offensive operation against Bougainvilleans in Papua New Guinea (Dorney 1998), or CACI’s 
and Titan’s interrogation and abuse scandal in Abu Ghraib (Banbury 20.12.2011), that has 
caused anger and embarrassment for the states and has challenged its ability and duty to 
protect life, maintain security and even uphold sovereignty. Of course, governments are 
worried about unregulated PMSC industry based in their territory because it poses a risk to the 
state and/or its citizens. The risk could be limited to international condemnation for providing 
safe haven to rogue PMSC-s or could be more far reaching, for example, where private 
military-security company is threatening states internal sovereignty. So, because the PMSC-s 
are operating within the state there is pressure, domestically and internationally, for that state 
to move preemptively to impose regulatory controls over those PMSC-s that fall within its 
jurisdiction. (Sheehy et al 2009: 120) 
  Even the UK government (notorious for its close involvement with the business in question) 
noted that there were two primary arguments favoring regulation of the private military-
security industry in their Green Paper from 2002; the first was the need to keep non-state 
violence under control and the second was the recognition that the nature of the transactions 
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entered into by PMSC-s are atypical commercial transactions with the potential to impact the 
stability of a country or region, so, according to this, regulation is necessary for PMSC-s to 
hold them accountable for their actions (Green Paper 20.12.2011).  
  Researchers, unfortunately, are divided over the efficacy of national regulatory efforts. J. 
Zarate believes that regulation at the national level is important for securing accountability of 
PMSC-s. He has noted that private military-security firms tend to be based in militarily 
advanced counties; so, on the practical level, this allows private military-security companies 
ease of access to military expertise and networks of retired military officers and on the 
strategic level, it allows PMSC-s to claim some from of state endorsement as the state has 
either tacitly agreed to the PMSC-s operation within its territory or it has expressly regulated 
the private military-security firms headquartered in relation to its contacts. So, if a state has 
introduced a regulatory regime to control PMSC-s then it should be able to exert a degree of 
control over the activities of PMSC-s incorporated and headquartered within its territory. 
(Zarate 1998: 76 – 78) Other researchers, like P. W. Singer, believe that regulation at the 
national level is doomed to fail; he notes that the ability of private military-security 
companies, as corporate entities, to dissolve, reform and move across borders with minimal 
effort makes them extremely difficult to control by states but there are other impediments to 
effective state regulation; firstly, the difficulty of defining precisely what the PMSC is and 
what it is about PMSC-s that is in need of regulation and secondly, the practical difficulties of 
designing and enforcing regulation that requires extraterritorial applications. Despite his 
skepticism about PMSC regulation generally, Singer notes that among the choices national 
regulation of private military-security firms offers hope of superior legal definition and 
enforcement. (Singer 2004a: 524, 534 – 537)  
  States advocating the regulation of PMSC-s need to clearly articulate which elements of the 
work undertaken by PMSC-s requires regulation. Before this task can be tackled it is 
necessary for a state to identify its regulatory objectives: Does it want to prohibit all private 
combat soldiers or perhaps all armed soldiers who are doing anything other then guarding an 
object or person? This type of regulatory focus would help address the issue of mercenarism 
but again definitional problems and disappearing difference with companies in the industry 
makes this focus problematic. Alternatively, a state could choose to tackle PMSC-s generally 
by controlling the type of contracts companies are permitted to enter into, so, the states will 
have to delimit the appropriate realm of activity for PMSC-s and then decide on the 
appropriate criterion for regulation. The criterion for regulation could include one or more of 
the following aspects of PMSC activity: The nature of the PMSC services being rendered, the 
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identity of the customer retaining the PMSC and their motive for retaining the private 
military-security companies services, the suitability of the PMSC providing the services or the 
physical location in which the PMSC services are rendered and of course the control of 
potentially lethal force. This latter criterion is the most important because the infliction of 
violence is the main matter of concern and hence potentially the critical activity for regulatory 
focus. The efficacy of the respective regulatory criterions would depend on the state’s 
ultimate regulatory objective and most importantly, its political will (we talked about the lack 
of it in previous chapter). (Sheehy et al 2009: 126)  
  So, in the next section we will look at the ways number of states have approached the issue 
of PMSC regulation, however, we should not hope that state regulation is much more 
effective then other methods we talked about because thanks to the lobbyers of the industry 
and national interests these state regulations are much weaker then they should be.  
  The US Arms Export Control Act of 1968 regulates both arms brokering and the export of 
military services. This Act now constitutes the primary law in the US establishing procedures 
for the sale of military equipment and related services. All US companies who are offering 
military advice to foreign nationals in the US or overseas are required to register with and 
obtain a license from State Department under the International Transfer of Arms Regulations 
(ITAR), which implement the Arms Export Control Act. The Government may refuse to issue 
a license if it believes that company is not upholding the high standards of the USA. (Green 
Paper 20.12.2011) One of the criticisms directed against the US licensing regime is that, 
pursuant to the ITAR, Congress does not need to be informed of a contract in advance of the 
issuance of a related license unless the contract is valued at over $50 million and the other 
problem with this regime is that once the company receives a license there are very limited 
oversights or reporting requirements. A further drawbacks of licensing regulatory schemes is 
that some may interpret the issuance of a license as evidence of state sanction for a particular 
PMSC activity, (Sheehy et al 2009: 130 – 131) and these people are quite right because states 
very often are using private contractors for obtaining their foreign policy objectives (I talked 
about this extensively in my previous chapter). Besides, it is not difficult at all for private 
military-security company to get its license form the US government, even if the US 
government is not discretely involved with the client.  
  Of course this licensing system could be more effective tool against PMSC misbehavior. It 
should be more transparent and monitored more effectively but in the absence of more 
effective national legislation in other states, this US model is often held up as a good example 
of PMSC regulation. By concentrating on exports it offers some control of private military-
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security firms that are operating in weak states that are unable to exercise any effective 
control and it sets some minimum standards for PMSC-s operating from US but it must be 
acknowledged that those standards are unfortunately nothing more then the whims of the 
president in power. (Sheehy et al 2009: 131)  
  As outlined in the Green Paper, the UK government has considered regulating PMSC-s in a 
variety of ways. Proposals have included enacting a complete prohibition on their activities, 
imposing a licensing regime on the provision of military services or permitting the PMSC 
industry to self-regulate through a voluntary code of conduct (Green Paper 20.12.2011). 
However, in the end, Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that Britain needs to develop 
a limited form of regulation that would not disrupt the “legitimate” activities of the PMSC 
industry. This kind of light regulation of private military-security industry allows UK to 
suggest that it is cleaning up the industry while at the same time benefiting from the 
widespread availability of unfettered PMSC-s. It is quite understandable, as some 
commentators suggest, that UK benefits directly from a close working relationship with 
disreputable private military-security companies and other British firms (like BP), that need 
these disreputable private military-security firms to further their business interests. Of course 
it is quite hard to prove but this might be the reason why UK government prefers light 
regulation and has not yet prosecuted and convicted any of PMSC-s involved with scandals, 
like “arms to Africa”. Regardless of speculative motives, the UK preference for light 
regulation fits well with the neo-liberal ideology that seeks to leave the market to regulate 
itself. (Sheehy et al 2009: 137)  
  The military-security industry in South Africa is a multimillion dollar business and there are 
about 4000 citizens currently working in the industry, some believe that this number is closer 
to 20 000. Given the apartheid history of South Africa and the pool of available military and 
security personnel, the statistic is not particularly surprising. To respond to this South African 
Parliament adopted a law regulating private military-security companies in 1998: The 
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 1998. Anyway, in 2005 South African 
government started their deliberations on a replacement law (The Prohibition of Mercenary 
Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Bill), (Sheehy et 
al 2009: 132 – 133) but it is not yet in effect.  
  With the Act of 1998, all companies and individuals were prohibited to take part in combat 
operations for private gain, it also prohibited the recruitment, training and financing of 
mercenaries. The legislation established a license-base regulatory scheme; a person or 
company wishing to provide military related services has to first register with National 
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Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), obtain governmental approval and then 
receive authorization to enter into a specific contract with the third party for the provision of 
these services. The decision on whether to approve the license lay with the Minister of 
Defense who acted on advice from NCACC. The strength of the Act is that it bans mercenary 
activates and regulates the provision of foreign military and security services abroad but this 
Act has an enormous weakness, it bites off more then it can chew; in the process of regulating 
those offering “foreign military assistance” it is in fact regulating all manner of service 
providers operating in the armed conflict situation, some are not even connected with security 
services. Besides that this Act has no effective parliamentary oversight, so, it is easily 
corruptible. Apart from this, large numbers of PMSC-s in South Africa and their employees 
have ignored the Act and it has not stopped preventing South African citizens and companies 
from providing a range of military services in Iraq and elsewhere. Of course this Act has 
never secured a legal conviction. (Sheehy et al 2009: 133 – 134)  
  The new Bill (will replace the Act of 1998) prohibits mercenary activity as well but in this 
Bill the mercenary activity is defined broadly, it includes not only participation for private 
gain in an armed conflict but also recruiting, training and financing a combatant in an armed 
conflict and it does not matter if you are participating directly or indirectly in armed conflict. 
The Bill now seeks to regulate PMSC-s by dictating when juristic persons, citizens or those 
permanently living in South Africa (foreigners when they commit offences within South 
Africa) can provide military/security assistance or service in conflict area. Furthermore, 
because of the tendency of PMSC-s to pose as humanitarian organizations the Bill also 
regulates humanitarian assistance offered by South Africa in conflict area. However, this new 
Bill is as toothless as the Act of 1998 because both of these legislations do not have an 
effective “big stick” to prosecute the individuals or companies that have breached the Act or 
will breach the new Bill. (Sheehy et al 2009: 134 – 135)  
  So, we see that those national regulatory systems are not very effective against the giants of 
the industry but despite that they still produce some minimum regulatory control and help the 
national and international legal institutions to produce more effective regulatory methods; 
there are some very good recommendation how we could control and regulate the private 
military-security industry but before we talk about those recommendations, we should talk 
about international law. Maybe the new international regulatory system can produce the 
effects we did not see in the industry or national level?  
  There has been number of documented abuses connected with PMSC-s, in the case of Abu 
Ghraib, various international norms were violated, including the Convention against Torture 
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and the 1949 Geneva Convention which prohibits governments from taking such actions, 
however, the ambiguous legal status of PMSC-s under existing international law offers 
leeway for countries to not only bend but also occasionally breach their international legal 
obligations, thus threatening the very fabric of international legal order (Dickinson 2005: 152 
– 153). Rights and duties that exist between the military and its contractors constitutes an 
uncertain, legal gray zone and so substantially reduces the potential for military to observe 
international legal obligations, the main problem is that the command and control, essential 
for military operation in the theater of conflict, is unclear with regard to private military 
personnel. As in the case of Iraq, commanders do not often know what the daily actions of 
firms are in their zones of responsibility. (Sheehy et al 2009: 143) In short, the difficulty with 
PMSC-s is that thanks to their wide range of services it is extremely difficult to create 
international regulatory system to control, observe and punish the companies that breach 
international law. However, there are some international conventions that can be used to 
regulate some aspects of private military-security industry (laws that govern the behavior of 
combatants in war) but it is not enough. Like we already showed in our previous chapters 
international humanitarian law does not mention the term “private military-security company” 
only “mercenary”. This, however, leaves wide legal openings and private military-security 
companies are extremely clever and skilled to exploit them. Besides without political will 
(from major governments) and effective insistence for universal convention against 
unregulated PMSC-s (from international organizations, NGO-s and charities) there will be no 
improvement for this case on international stage. So, it might look like that there is no 
regulations for PMSC-s in the international level.  
  However, it is well established rule of international law that breaches of international law 
committed by individuals classified as state organs will engage state responsibility, even if 
forces exceed their authority and acts are performed privately (Sheehy et al 2009: 158). 
Besides, according to industries understandings of legitimacy (discussed in previous chapter) 
every client that contracts services from private military-security companies is liable and 
accountable of any action conducted by the companies, it is impossible for clients to deny 
their involvement. However, in the real world nobody has ever been convicted of breaking the 
rules and misbehaving in operation conducted by PMSC-s (neither clients nor companies). 
For example, in 2007, the US government investigated the accusation that Blackwater 
employees are smuggling illegal weapons into Iraq, of course no charges were filed (MSNBC 
24.07.2012). Thus, it shows that national and international levels are very closely connected, 
it might not be the better regulatory system but in the end it might provide prosecutors legal 
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“ammunition” to punish the misbehaviors, if not legally then commercially, by making the 
company’s stock plummet.  
  It is understandable that there is no easy formula for regulating PMSC industry. So, various 
forms of regulation will likely have to exist. State regulation would likely be most effective if 
there were a statutory regulatory body; this body should be wholly independent of the private 
military-security industry lobby. It would be tasked with regulating and administrating the 
industry and have responsibility for overseeing the vetting of personnel and directors, it would 
be charged with the development of further regulation, the investigation of complaints and 
incidents, the conduct of independent spot audits and the provision and re-sourcing of 
observers. It will be important to keep a clear space between the self-regulatory body and the 
legislative scheme and regulatory agency for the obvious danger of regulatory capture 
inherent in close industry-regulator relations. Given the clear danger to the people from 
PMSC activity, the protection of the people must always be given priority over PMSC 
interests and communication between a regulator and PMSC must always be open to public 
scrutiny. (Sheehy et al 2009: 139 – 140) Singer, however, suggests some kind of international 
body that will operate under the auspices of the UN as designed and informed by 
governments, the academy, NGO-s, and the firms themselves could establish the parameters 
of the issues and lay out potential forms of regulation, evaluation tools and codes of conduct 
because he believes that PMSC-s have the opportunity to escape local regulations, so, it needs 
international body to be effective. This body would be charged with auditing PMSC-s and 
their contracts to prevent PMSC-s from being retained by unsavory clients or engage in 
actions contrary to public good. This body would have the power to demand operational 
oversight and appoint observers who would be tasked with ensuring the LOAC and contract 
terms are not breached and furthermore, Singer recommends that this body should not only 
punish misbehaviors with market remedies but with full legal power and to achieve this 
PMSC-s should submit to host state jurisdiction or be submitted to universal jurisdiction of 
the ICC. (Singer 2004b: 17 – 22; Singer 25.12.2011) Of course those recommendations are 
not yet governing the military-security industry but hopefully in near future they will be 
implemented but we should understand that this industry is still in developing stage and that 
means that regulatory methods that might work today might not work for the military-security 
industry tomorrow. 
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Conclusion 
 
  It does not matter if private military-security companies conduct legal or illegal operations; 
they have established themselves as important actors on the international stage. As with any 
international system, the provision of private security is closely related to the structure of the 
security sector as a whole and the key factors that define this context in today’s international 
system are military downsizing, technology, monetary efficiency and political expediency. 
(Kinsey 2006: 151) Besides, I am sure that it is self-evident to everybody by now that these 
actors are not disappearing any time soon. It would require a change to the nature of the 
international system and even then, certain parts of the industry, particularly IT companies 
that service advanced weapons systems, will in all probability remain.  
  Like we saw in this paper, there is only one universal legislation that deals with private 
violence, however, it only defines the term “mercenary” and does not mention any actions 
that might be considered somewhat close with mercenary activity. This only legislation is the 
1977 First Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention of 1949. Of course, there are other 
international documents, like 1989 UN Convention against mercenary activity and OAU 
document, but they are not working, mainly because they have the exact same inherent 
definitional weaknesses as Additional Protocol, besides these documents are ignored by every 
major state in the world (UN Convention is not even ratified by the Power Houses of 
international community and if we look at the current situation they will probably never ratify 
it or at least not in this form) So, only document that has even some legal power is the 
Additional Protocol. However, this legal document is outdated and it is not usable to 
determine the definitive legal status of those post-Cold War private commercial entities we 
call private military-security companies. Therefore, all the today’s private military-security 
companies are flourishing and conducting international contract operations within a vacuum 
of effective and applicable international legislation that truly defines and establishes their 
international legitimacy (Goddard 2001: 80).  
  Private military-security companies have this legitimacy problem because there are no legal 
documents that deal with them, so, it is hard to get some legitimacy if you are not mentioned 
in any of legal documents. This situation is occurred because many national governments 
have balked all the effective means to create universal legislation that deals with PMSC-s, 
mainly because this obscure situation benefits them and probably military-security industry as 
well (more governmental contracts). This situation includes those Western governments who 
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seek to exploit the opportunity to utilize selective PMSC-s for the discrete execution of 
contentious aspects of their national foreign policy as well as those nations who seek to 
contract PMSC-s for assistance in effecting their own integral national security (Goddard 
2001: 80). Of course states are not alone. Thanks to the increasing significance and use many 
others, like international organizations, NGO-s and so on, have started to ignore the problem 
of legitimacy and because of that they do not demand, as loudly as they should, universal 
convention that could effectively define, control and regulate the activates of private military-
security companies. Therefore, it is not surprising that private military-security companies 
(legal corporate entities that provide military and security services for commercial gain) have 
created their own understanding of legitimacy. According to them, legitimate clients that use 
their services provide legitimacy to their operations and for them. Unfortunately, this kind of 
PR trick (helped by industries legal professionals) does not chance the fact that there is no 
international law that gives them any legitimacy. So, in strict legal sense PMSC-s are in fact 
illegitimate actors in the international stage and therefore their operations are illegitimate as 
well.  
  Regulation is very controversial and problematic topic, especially when we talk about 
private military-security companies. However, not only activists and researchers are dealing 
with the questions of regulation and control. Because of the problems private military-security 
companies face with legitimacy, they have understood that legitimacy problem can be 
“buried” if they can produce some regulatory and control system for themselves (of course it 
should be the system that industry controls). Even states have seen the benefits of regulation 
because it does not only protect governments’ officials and the industry but it will be a 
popular move for voters, of course too much regulation and control is not good for anybody. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that industry has started to talk about self-regulation. Industry 
has even produced a Code of Conduct for everybody working in military-security industry; 
however, there is no compliant mechanism in the Code, which decreases the likelihood that 
any of braches of Code will be reported to proper authorities, besides there is no mention of a 
compliance officer or a regular audit process and if the member breaches the Code then the 
only sanction they face is being dismissed from the IPOA (industries association). So, self-
regulation method is insufficient without a framework of international or national regulation. 
Unfortunately, there is no effective international legislation (like we saw already); it needs 
collective international will for it to exist, however, it does not exist, yet. So, effective 
international regulation will remain at its current impasse, waiting for better times and 
substantial international dialogue and consensus. Lacking any effective international 
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regulation, the final tier of regulation rests at the national level (Goddard 2001: 82). There are 
many good methods that states use, however, they are too weak and too easy to manipulate to 
work properly and regulate military-security industry effectively. So, PMSC-s are not 
effectively nor consistently regulated at either the international or national levels. However, 
real potential in the forms of accreditation, certification, and effective legislation does exist at 
both the international and national levels for this current situation to be reversed (Goddard 
2001: 83), political will has to be achieved and it is not only the obligation of the states; all 
the clients of this industry have to understand that the situation we are in can not last.  
  Same problems are with the accountability, it seams logical that clients that contract services 
with companies share the accountability. This idea has been widely accepted, however, no 
company or its client has ever been properly convicted (they have been accused and fined and 
some of the employees have been fired for misbehaving) of any crime made in the operational 
environment. Nobody holds this industry accountable for its actions, however, it is not 
hopeless, it only requires will; unfortunately it is not yet beneficial for the major players of the 
international environment to have clarity about accountability.  
  It seams that private military-security companies have not lost their momentum because of 
their legitimacy problem; they have grown to be one of the most significant actors in the 
international stage. However, they will always be accused of being mercenaries (of course it 
is not true, there are significant differences between them and mercenaries) and they will 
never be equal to other legitimate actors in the international stage until proper universal 
legislation that defines them is ratified and in force. 
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Kokkuvõte 
Sõjanduse- ja julgeolekuga seotud eraettevõtted kui õiguspäratud 
toimijad rahvusvahelises julgeolekukeskkonnas 
 
  Külma sõja lõpp tõi endaga kaasa tohutuid muutusi: ei muutunud ainult geopoliitiline 
struktuur ja jõuvahekorrad maailmas, vaid esile kerkisid ka uued toimijad, kes küll 
eksisteerisid Külma sõja viimastel kümnenditel, kuid olid riikidest sõltuvad ja ei omanud suurt 
mõju üleüldisele julgeoleku keskkonnale. Alles pärast Külma sõda leidsid nad endale kindla 
koha rahvusvahelisel tasandil. Tänu sellele, et superriigid oma endised „liitlased” 
vähearenenud riikides mahajätsid, puhkesid 1990-ndate mitmel pool konfliktid, mida hakati 
teadusringkondades kutsuma „uuteks sõdadeks”, erinevus siinjuures eelmistest sõdadest 
seisneb identiteedi poliitikas. Omavahel konflikti sattuvad rühmad ei sõdi sellepärast 
(vähemalt mitte ainult), et saavutada kontrolli suurema ja/või parema territooriumi üle; 
konflikti põhjuseks on rahvuslik, usuline jne. küsimus ning ainus võimalus võita on vastane 
täielikult likvideerida. Sellepärast pole ka ime, et seesugust sõda iseloomustab ülemäärane 
jõhkrus (mass tapmised, süstemaatiline vägistamine jne.) mitte ainul lahinguväljal, vaid 
kõikjal konflikti piirkonnas. Üksi jäetud, idablokk oli kokkuvarisenud ning Lääsi huvipuudusel 
ükskõikne, olid vähearenenud riigid sunnitud abi otsima uutelt tegutsejatelt rahvusvahelisel 
tasandil, kelleks olidki sõjanduse-ja julgeolekuga seotud eraettevõtted. Tegemist on 
ettevõtetega, kes pakuvad kleintidele teenuseid, mis on seotud  sõjanduse-ja julgeolekuga, 
nende hulka kuuluvad võitlusüksused, treening, toetust pakkuvad üksused (õhujõud, 
meditsiiniüksus jne.), kaitse, julgeoleku tagamine, luureteenus, isegi ülesehitus tööd ja 
logistika ning palju muudki. Carlos Ortizi definitsiooni järgi on sõjandus-ja julgeolekuga 
seotud eraettevõtted need ettevõtted, kes on seaduslikult loodud ja teenivad kasumit pakkudes 
oma klentidele sõjalist ja julgeoleku süstematiseeritud teenust, samas ei pea neil ettevõtetel 
olema aktiivset militaarset rolli, siiski peavad nad olema suutelised oma kleindi sõjalist ja/või 
julgeoleku võimekust tõstma ning tagama (Ortiz 2004: 206).  
  Julgeoleku erastamine ei ole midagi uut, seda on tehtud juba sajandeid, kuid pärast 
rahvusriikide loomist ning kodanike armeede esilekerkimist 19. sajandi keskel antud ärimudel 
haihtus. Siiski ei saa me sõjanduse-ja julgeolekuga tegelevaid eraettevõtteid seostada 
ajalooliste palgasõduritega ega nendegagi, kes Külma sõja perjoodil Aafrikas ja mujalgi 
tegutsesid. Erinevus siinkohal tuleneb sellest, et sõjanduse-ja julgeolekuga tegelevad 
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eraettevõtted on ärid, kellel on kindel struktuur, juhtkond, töötajaskond ning peakorter, samas 
kui palgasõdurid seisavad väljaspool seadust ning on sunnitud sellepärast oma tegutsemist 
varjama. Samuti ei ole palgasõdurid huvitatud oma maine hoidmisest, sest niikuinii oled oma 
tegevuse pärast kurjategijaks tembeldatud. Siiski ei ole lihtne kedagi lihtsalt palgasõduriks 
olemise pärast vangi panna, sest definitsioon on väga kindel ning isik peab vastama kõigile 
esitatud tingimustele. See eest meid huvitavad eraettevõtted on vägagi huvitatud, et nende 
maine oleks positiivne, sest maine rikkumine toob kaasa lepingute üles ütlemise ja üleüldise 
majandusliku kahju (usalduse kadumine mõjutab tugevalt ettevõtete aktsiate hindu börsil). 
Nagu juba eespool sai öeldud, tänapäevased sõjanduse-ja julgeolekuga tegelevad 
eraettevõtted ei ole saanud alguse palgasõdurite organisatsioonidest (Vabad kompaniid), mis 
said alguse 14. sajandil. Neil kompaniidel puudub seos tänapäevaste eraettevõtetega, kes 
sõjandus ja julgeoleku teenust pakuvad, mitte ainult sellepärast et neil oli väga piiratud haare 
ja teenused, vaid kogu nende struktuur ja ärimudel oli täiest erinev. Sellepärast ongi leitud, et 
antud eraettevõtete ajalooliseks embrioks on 17. sajandil tegutsemist alustanud 
kaubanduskompaniid (näiteks: Briti Ida-India Kompanii), kes mitte ainult ei loonud sarnase 
struktuuri, juhtimiskorralduse ja ärimudeli, vaid pakkusid tänapäevastele kompaniidele 
sarnaseid teenuseid, nagu näiteks kaitset, võitlusüksusi, luuret, sõjatehnoloogiat jne.  
  Hoolimata sellest, et need kompaniid on kasvanud ühtedeks mõjuvõimsamateks toimijateks 
rahvusvahelisel tasandil, ei ole nad probleemidest priid. Peamiseks probleemiks ongi neil 
ettevõtetel nende legitiimsus ehk tegelikult selle puudumine. Rahvusvahelise õiguse 
seisukohalt pole neid üldsegi olemas, sest termin „erajulgeoleku ettevõte” ei esine kusagil 
rahvusvahelise õiguse dokumentides. Samuti on kõik praegused õiguslikud dokumendid, mis 
tegelevad vägivalla erastamisega ajale jalgu jäänud ehk kaotanud igasuguse võime kuidagigi 
reguleerida kaasaegset julgeoleku keskkonda. Siiski püüavad sõjanduse-ja julgeolekuga 
tegelevad eraettevõtted läbi PR-kampaaniate tõestada, et neil on õigus ja seaduslik alus oma 
teenuseid müüa legitiimsetele klentidele. Nendeks klentideks pole mitte ainult õiguspärased 
valitsused, vaid ka rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid, mitte-riiklikud organisatsioonid, 
hargmaised korporatsioonid ja heategevusorganisatsioonid. Tänu just erajulgeoleku 
ettevõtete klentidele on rahvusvaheline õigusruum ilma konventsioonita, mis määratleks ära 
sõjanduse-ja julgeolekuga tegelevate eraettevõtete tegevuse ning õigusliku staatuse. 
Peamiseks põhjuseks on poliitilise soovi puudumine. Mõjuvõimsatel riikidel (USA ja teised 
Lääneriigid) puudub huvi sellepärast, et erajulgeoleku ettevõtete abil on nad võimelised 
täitma salaja oma välispoliitilisi eesmärke, sest alati ei ole võimalus seesugustel riikidel saata 
oma lahingüksusi või riiklike nõuandjaid kriisipiirkondadesse, probleemiks võiks olla näiteks 
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sisepoliitiline jõuetus „müüa” uus välispoliitiline eesmärk oma valijaskonnale. Teised 
legitiimsed klendid on aga samuti süüdi praeguses olukorras (erajulgeoleku ettevõtete 
tegutsemine legitiimsus vaakumis), tänu sellele, et nad on suurendanud märkimisväärselt 
sõjanduse-ja julgeolekuga tegelevate eraettevõttete kasutamist (kompaniide kasutus on just 
suurenenud rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide ja mitte-riiklike organisatsioonide seas, sest 
erajulgeoleku ettevõtted ei taga neile vaid efektiivset kaitset ja logistilist toetust 
kriisipiirkondades, vaid vähendavad oluliselt ka kulutuste suurust, mis kuluks 
kriisipiirkondades tegutsemisele ning inimeste palkamisele). Seesugune sõltuvussuhe on 
toonud endaga kaasa olukorra, kus valjuhäälsed kriitikud on muudetud klentideks, kes  enam 
ei ole nii valjuhäälsed erajulgeoleku ettevõtete kriitikud ega rahvusvahelise konventsiooni 
(mis defineeriks ja reguleeriks erajulgeoleku ettevõtteid) nõudjad. Tänu seesugusele 
ebaharilikule olukorrale on sõjanduse-ja julgeolekuga tegelevad eraettevõtted loonud 
endajaoks uue legitiimsussüsteemi, selle järgi annavad just õiguspärased klendid, kes 
erajulgeoleku ettevõtteid kasutavad, neile ja nende operatsioonidele legitiimsuse (legitiimne 
klent, kasutades erajulgeoleku ettevõtte teenust, tunnustab selle ettevõtte seaduslikkust ehk 
legitiimsust). Kahjuks ei muuda seesugune „trikitamine” fakti, et erajulgeoleku ettevõtted 
pole mainitud üheski rahvusvahelises konventsioonis, mis omakorda tähendabki, et ranges 
õiguslikus tähenduses pole ükski erajulgeoleku ettevõte ega tema operatsioon õiguspärane.  
  Antud tööstuse regulatsiooni puudulikkus on olnud probleemiks juba aastaid ja seda on 
tunnistanud ettevõtted isegi. Probleem seisneb selles, et nii tavaline äriõigus kui ka tööstuse 
enses regulatsiooni meetodid pole piisavalt tugevad, et ettevõtteid piisavalt efektiivselt 
kontrollida, samuti on tänasel päeval ebapiisavad riikide eneste õigussüsteemid, 
rahvusvahelisest õigusest rääkimata. Muidugi on mingisugused seadused loodud, kuid nad 
reguleerivad ainult väikest osa tööstusest ja pole võimelised karistama neid ettevõtteid, kes 
reegleid rikuvad. Loodetavasti lähiaastatel valmib rahvusvaheline konvensioon, mis antud 
olukorda kuidagigi parandab. Sellegi poolest ei tohi me ootama jääda, vaid peame nõudma, 
et riigid ise siseriikliku õigusloomega antud olukorda parandaksid.  
  Sellest hoolimata, et erajulgeoleku ettevõtted on rahvusvahelise seaduse alusel õiguspäratud 
on nende mõju pidevalt kasvanud, pole maailmas kriisi ega konflikti, kus me ei kohtaks mõnda 
erajulgeoleku ettevõtet. Siiski ei ole need ettevõtted võrdsed teiste legitiimsete toimijatega 
rahvusvahelisel tasandil, kui pole vastu võetud ja ratifitseeritud rahvusvahelist konventsioon, 
mis mitte ainult ei defineeri meile erajulgeoleku ettevõtet, vaid määratleb ära reeglid, mida 
see tööstus ning tema liikmed peavad järgima koos oma klentidega.  
